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THE RISE AND FALL OF CHINESE TAx INCENTIVES AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX DEBATES

by
Jinyan Li*

I. INTRODUCTION

China had no foreign direct investment (FDI) before 1979. Now, it is
one of the world's largest recipients of FDI. China has been generous to a fault
in granting tax incentives to foreign investors. As of January 1, 2008, however,
these FDI-specific incentives will be abolished or phased out. What explains the
rise and fall? Were the tax incentives not effective in attracting FDI and
promoting China's economic growth? What are the implications of the Chinese
experience for international tax debates? This article examines these questions.
Part II of the Article provides an overview of the Chinese tax incentive
regimes for FDI. It briefly discusses the creation, expansion, and termination of
tax incentives and the key motivations at each stage. Part III evaluates these
incentives in terms of their effectiveness, efficiency and fairness. Effectiveness
is examined on the basis of general data about FDI growth in China and
empirical research on investors' reactions to Chinese tax incentives. The
economic efficiency of tax incentives is assessed by looking at the positive
externalities of FDI in China, the un-intended distortions to investment
behaviour, and the extent to which the incentives lead to tax discrimination
against local business. The equity aspect of tax incentives is assessed in terms
of the role of tax policy in achieving redistributive justice in China. Part IV
explores the implications of the Chinese experience for the debate on the use of
tax policy in attracting FDI, harmful tax competition and international
redistribution. Part V concludes the paper.

* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Senior Fellow, Taxation Law
and Policy Research Institute, Monash University. I thank Yariv Brauner, Rick Krever,
Yoram Mongoliah, David Piccolo, Joan Weiner, Martin McMahon, Jr., Lawrence

Lokken, Paul McDaniel and participants in the 2007 International Tax Law Symposium
at the University of Florida Levin College of Law for their comments on earlier drafts

of this paper. I also thank He Huang for her excellent research assistance and Yariv
Brauner for his feedback to another paper that led to the writing of this paper.
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF CHINESE TAx INCENTIVES

A. Chinese Income Tax Law Born With FDI Tax Incentives
The modem income tax system in China came into existence with the
promulgation of the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Income Tax Law1
(the "EJV Tax Law") in 1980 and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (FEIT)
Law in 198 1.2 The former was applicable to equity joint ventures formed by a
foreign investor and a Chinese partner (typically at that time a state-owned
enterprise). The latter was applicable to other forms of FDI, including
contractual joint ventures, joint explorations, and wholly foreign-owned
enterprises. Both laws contained generous tax incentives, 3 but those under the
EJV Tax Law were more generous because China was not very enthusiastic
about foreign companies operating in China without a local equity partner.4
The two tax laws were among the first laws 5 fashioned by China to
facilitate economic reforms and foreign investment. Back in the late 1970s,
China was well aware of the fact that it was 12 hours ahead of the United States
and in taking its
in time, but "decades behind in technology, infrastructure ...
place in world affairs.",6 China wanted to catch up with the United States
through economic development. FDI was expected to boost economic growth
by bringing to China not only capital, but also the badly-needed technology,
1. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Joint
Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (the "EJV Tax Law"), passed by the
National People's Congress (NPC) on 10 September 1980. The implementing
regulations for this law were issued by the Ministry of Finance on 14 December
1980. Individual Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China was also
promulgated by the NPC in 1980.
2. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning
Foreign Enterprises, promulgated by the NPC on December 13, 1981 ("FEIT Law").
Instead of the flat rate of 30% of national tax as under the EJV Tax Law, the FEIT
Law imposed tax at progressive rates, ranging from 20% to 40%. A local tax was
imposed at 10% of the national tax, resulting in the top rate of 44% (as opposed to
33% for equity joint ventures).
3. These include tax holidays and reinvestment refunds. See infra notes 44-47.
4. The incentives under the FEIT were thus less generous. For example, a tax
holiday of three years was standard under the EJV Income Tax Law, but was available
under the FEIT only if the investment was scheduled to operate for at least ten years in
farming, forestry, animal husbandry or other low-profit operations.
5. Others include The Law of the People's Republic of China on ChineseForeign Equity Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment, adopted on July
1, 1979 at the second session ofthe Fifth National People's Congress, amended on April
4, 1990; Regulations for the Implementation of the Equity Joint Venture Law,
promulgated by the State Council on September 20, 1983.
6. Allison E. Wielobob, China's Choice: Tax Incentives to Fund Economic
Development, 9 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L. J. 413, at 416 (1995).
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management skills, and access to international markets.7 However, creating a
regulatory regime for FDI in general and tax system in particular was a daunting
task. China had never had an income tax8 or a legal tradition familiar to foreign
investors. The over 2000 years of cultural and legal tradition led to the use of
formal law as primarily penal law and administrative law - a set of commands
instructing bureaucrats on how to govern the country. 9 Under three decades of
Maoist governance, "law became politicized and shrunken symbol of
governance, used instrumentally as a mere vessel for changing policies."'" The
combination of the legal tradition and Maoist regime left behind neither
traditions nor institutions that would support a legal system appropriate for a
market-driven economy." I
The lack of precedence made it necessary for China to consider
international experiences as references. Initially, foreign businessmen advised
China to offer tax incentives to FDI. 12 Chinese officials were aware of the tax
incentives being offered by Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Thailand,

7. Huang, Yasheng, The Benefits of FDI in a Transitional Economy: The Case
of China, in New Horizons for Foreign Direct Investment. Paris, OECD (2003).
8. When the modem income tax was introduced in the United States (1913) and
Canada (1917), China was undergoing civil wars and political turmoil, which ended
when the Communist Party declared the establishment of the People's Republic on
October 1, 1949. After the 1949, foreign capital left China and domestic private capital
was confiscated. Capitalism and market were incompatible with the Communist Partyled socialism. The absence of international investment and business transactions
eliminated any need for any international taxation. When foreign investors were allowed
back to China in the late 1970s, it was considered appropriate to impose an income tax
on them. For an overview of the evolution of the Chinese tax system, see Jinyan Li,
Taxation in the People's Republic of China. Praeger, New York, 1991); Alec Easson
and Jinyan Li, Taxation of Foreign Investment in the Peoples's Republic of China.
Kluwer, The Netherlands (1989). For an overview of the history of legal reform
concerning foreign direct investment, see Jian Zhou, National Treatment in Foreign
Investment Law: A Comparative Study from a Chinese Perspective, 10 Touro Int'l L.
Rev. 39, at 50-65 (2000).
9. For more discussion on the Chinese legal traditions, see Randall
Peerenboom, China's Long March Toward Rule of Law. New York: Cambridge
University Press (2002); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage - Legal Reform in China
After Mao. Standord, Calif.: Stanford University Press (1999); Stanley B. Lubman,
Looking for Law in China, Columbia J. of Asian Law 1 (2006); Hsu, C. Stephen, ed.,
Understanding China's Legal System: Essays in Honor of Jerome A. Cohen. New York:
New York University Press (2003); Xin Ren, Tradition of the Law and Law of the
Tradition: Law, State, and Social. New York, Greenwood Press 1997.
10. Lubman (2006), id., at 5.
11. Id.
12. See Richard Pomp and Stanley Surrey, The Tax Structure of the People's
Republic of China, 20 Va. J.Int'l L. 1 at 12 (1979).
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Singapore and other countries.' 3 Chinese officials were advised that some
international experts questioned the efficiency and effectiveness of tax
incentives,1 4 but they remained concerned that China would be unable to
compete for5 FDI unless it offered tax incentives similar to those provided
elsewhere. 1
Granting tax preferences was a key strategy from a political, cultural
and economic perspective. 6 Politically, granting tax preferences to FDI sent a
clear signal to foreign investors China's desire for their investment. This
signalling effect was historically important because China suffered from serious
image problems due to its previous hostile policies to foreign investors. The
choice ofthe very word in the Chinese language, "you hui" (preferences) for tax
incentives conveyed a positive message. This message was widely disseminated
17
and viewed as a key to the success of efforts to promote foreign investment.
Offering generous tax preferences to foreign investors was also
consistent with Chinese hospitality and respect for friendship. Tax preferences
were presented as gifts or rewards to overseas investors. The Confucian way of
dealing with foreigners was to be "generous with gifts without calculating the
'' 8
value of tribute and to grant them honours without making heavy demands.
The Chinese believed that by showing generosity and hospitality they could
exert moral influence on non-Chinese and lead them to "participate in the
benefits of (Chinese) civilization."' 9 The grant of tax preferences is associated
with the Chinese respect or dependence on relationships (or "guanxi" in
Chinese) because exchanges of gifts are an important practice in establishing
and retaining relationships. Whether foreign investors actually came to China
or even expressed an interest in doing business with the country, the Chinese
claimed them as friends. Investors could interpret tax preferences as
reciprocation for their friendly acts of investing in China. 20 This relationshipbuilding effect of tax preferences may have a special appeal to overseas Chinese
investors. Some of them may have been affected by the Communist Party's
previous harsh policies and may regard gestures such as granting preferential
13. See Liu, Longheng, Introduction to Chinese Tax Law. Beijing University
Press (1986), at 240 (in Chinese).
14. Pomp and Surrey, supra note 12 at 12.
15. Id.
16. This promise was first made in the 1979 Equity Joint Venture Law, which
was the first piece of legislation governing FDI since the inception of reforms. Just as
punitive rates under the previous system were the legacy of policies that reflected past
hostility toward foreign and private capital, in new Equity Joint Venture Law was
testament to a favourable policy change.
17. Zhaodong Jiang, China's Tax Preferences to Foreign Investment: Policy,
Culture and Modem Concepts, 18 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 549 at 611 (2000).
18. Id., at 618.
19. Id.
20. Id., at 630.
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treatment as implied apologies and compensation for past ill-treatment. Some
overseas Chinese have a strong attachment to their ancestral land and returned
to their native villages and hometowns for sentimental as well as business
reasons. They felt welcome when local government presented them with gifts,
including tax preferences.2 1
The use of tax preferences was also motivated by pragmatic reasons.
China was aware of its economic attractiveness to foreign investors: cheap
labour, rich natural resources, and a potentially huge domestic market. It also
knew that it had limited resources to develop the necessary infrastructure. As
such, funding FDI through tax preferences 22 (i.e., foregoing the potential tax
revenue should FDI actually come and make profit) seemed a good strategy. In
addition to solving the potential cash problem, granting tax preferences was also
more expedient and may have compensated for the lack of an ideal investment
environment. 23 It would take time for China to develop the necessary
institutional environment in terms of property rights protection and government
policy creditability.

21. Id. This emphasis on building relationships through gift exchanges created
some problems. Local officials preferred to broad powers in granting tax preferences

and to outperform other local officials in competing for the investment, resulting in
regional tax competition and disregard of centrally-made tax policy. The tax preferences
presumably played an important role in attracting overseas Chinese investors. Much of
the Chinese FDI inflow consists of capital from three ethnically Chinese economies:

Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. Hong Kong and Taiwan have been among the top
source countries of FDI inflow to China. FDI from these three sources accounted for
59.3% of China's total FDI inflows between 1978 and 1999. Ethnic Chinese capital

suppliers in Asia, North America and other parts of the world also contributed to the
rapid growth of FDI in China. See Huang (1999), supra note 7, at 36.
22. See Wielobob, supra note 6.

23. For more discussion on these effects, see Richard E. Caves, Multinational
Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge University press, Cambridge (1996);
John Dunning, Investment Incentives throughout Asia, in Explaining International
Production., Unwin Hyman, London (1988); -, Multinational Enterprises and the Global
Economy. Addison-Wesley, New York (1993); Eckhard Janeba, Attracting FDI in a
Politically Risky World, 43 (4) International Economic Rev. 1127-55 (2002); Thomas

Porcano and Charles E. Price, The Effect of Government Tax and Nontax Incentives on
Foreign Direct Investment, 4 Multinational Business Rev. 9-19 (1996); Robert J. Rolfe

and Richard A. White, Investors' Assessment of the Importance of Tax Incentives in
Locating Foreign Export-Oriented Investment: An Exploratory Study, 14 The J. of the
American Taxation Association 39-57 (1992); Dennis Rondinelli and William J. Brupitt,
Do Government Incentives Attract and Retain International Investment? A Study of
Foreign-Owned Firms in North Carolina, 33 (2) Policy Sciences 181-205 (2000); and

Louise Single, Tax Holidays and Firm's Subsidiary Location Desires, 21 (2) The J. of
the American Taxation Association 17-34 (1999).
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B. The Rise

During the 1980s and 1990s, special preferential tax regimes for FDI
experienced a huge boom. A major aspect of the Chinese FDI policy is
development region by region. The strategy is to concentrate limited resources
for the improvement of infrastructure in small geographic areas. Another aspect
of the policy is to encourage export, which could not only earn foreign
currency, but also keep FDI separate from the domestic market.
In 1980, China established four "special economic zones" (SEZs) along
the south coast (i.e. Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and
close to Hong Kong, and Xiamen in Fujian Province (across from Taiwan) 24 in
order to attract investors in general and investors from Hong Kong, Macau,
Taiwan in particular. The Central Government allowed these zones to
experiment with reforms in governance and regulations and granted additional
tax preferences to FDI in these zones.25 The hope was that foreign capital would
turn a small number of sites into an overnight success story. The government
could then26use the success of the SEZs for a variety of political and economic
purposes.
The immediate success of the SEZs led China to designate 14 coastal
cities as: "Coastal Open Cities" in 1984. Certain areas of these cities were
designated as "economic and technological development areas" and others as
"old urban district. ''27 Tax incentives in economic and technological
development areas were very close to those in SEZs, but incentives in coastal
open cities were less generous. 28 A third wave of special areas were designated
in 1985 - "coastal economic open regions," consisting of urban and rural areas

24. For discussions of Chinese SEZs, see Kevin B. Bucknall, China and the
Open Door Policy. Routledge (Nov. 1990) 143-67; Norman Y.T. Ng, From Special
Economic Zones to the Coastal Open Cities: A Strategy for Modernization of China, in
Joseph Y.S. Cheng, ed. China: Modernization in the 1980s. Chinese University Press
(1989)
25. See Provisional Regulations of the State Council of the People's Republic
of China Regarding the Reduction of and Exemption from Enterprises Income Tax and
Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax in the Special Economic Zones and the
Fourteen Coastal Cities, issued by the State Council on Nov. 15, 1984.
26. See Jiang, supra note 17; Ng, supra note 24, at 448-49; Bucknall, supra note
24 at 144.
27. The fourteen coastal cities were Tianjin, Shanghai, Dalian, Qinhuangdao,
Yantai, Qingdao, Lianyungang, Nantong, Ningbo, Wenzhou, Fuzhou, Guangzhou,
Zhanjiang, and Beihai.
28. See Jiang, supra note 17. For example, a reduced 15% tax rate was
applicable to EJVs, CJVs and WFOEs in "old urban districts" that were technology or
know-how intensive and had an investment exceeding 30 million U.S. dollars and a long
investment recovery period, or the projects related to energy, transport or port
construction.
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in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas, and the South Fujian region. 29 These
regions were generally better positioned than the rest of the country in attracting
FDI as they had geographic advantages, a relatively more developed industrial,
technological and infrastructure base than the rest of the country, and were the
ancestral home to most Overseas Chinese. 30 The tax preferences in the SEZs
remained the most generous. To allow exactly the same preferential treatment
in non-SEZ areas was
thought to lead to unhealthy competition and divert
31
SEZs.
from
attention
In addition to special regions, special FDI projects or activities received
preferential tax treatment. The two most well-known types of projects were
export-oriented32 and technologically-advanced.3 3 Reinvestment in either type
of enterprise was eligible for a full refund of the tax paid on the reinvested
profit. Other preferred investments include infrastructure projects,34
"productive" activities, agriculture and animal husbandry. Services and passive
investment were not encouraged.
The formal tax discrimination between EJVs and other forms of FDI
seemed to make little sense by the end of the 1980s. By then, the majority of
FDI was either located in special areas or involving preferred investment
projects, receiving similar tax preferences, irrespective of the form of the
investment. In 1991, the EJV Income Tax and the FElT were consolidated into
the "Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax" (or FIE

29. Jiang, supra note 17. The list of coastal economic open regions was later
expanded to cover over 150 cities and counties in 8 provinces. See Notice of the State
Council Concerning the Enlargement ofthe Scope of Coastal Economic Open Regions],
1988 Fagui Huibian 446. As a result, they reach the East Liaoning and East Shangdong
Peninsulas.
30. These regions had been the main bases of China's traditional export
industries like textiles, handicrafts, light industry and native products.
31. Jiang, supra note 17, at 575.
32. "Export-oriented enterprises" were defined as enterprises that produce
goods mainly (over 70%) for export and maintain a net positive foreign exchange
balance at the end of the year.
33. "Technologically-advanced enterprises" were enterprises which, with
advanced technology provided by foreign investors, are able to develop new products,
or upgrade existing products, and therefore earn foreign exchange through exports or
import substitution.
34. Irrespective of the location of the investment, the tax rate was reduced to
15% for equity joint ventures in port and berth construction projects. New projects
scheduled to operate for 15-years or more were eligible for a 10-year tax holiday (a 5year exemption followed by a 5-year 50% reduction in tax). The tax holiday might be
extended upon approval by the Ministry of Finance. Withholding tax on distributions
of profits was waived, as was the local income tax. See Jiang, supra note 17.
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Tax). 35 Existing tax incentives granted by way of administrative decrees were
incorporated into the new law.
After 1991, new tax incentives continued to be granted. The Pudong
New District was created in the City of Shanghai 36 in order to develop Shanghai
into a world-class financial centre. Other "special" regions included western
regions, North-East regions, border cities, bonded zones, tourist and resort
areas, and "High and New Technology Industrial Development Areas."3 7 The
rise of special areas away from the coastal regions effectively made the special
tax regimes in the coastal region less special. As a result, the coastal regions
created new types of special zones to remain competitive, including bonded
zones, free trade zones, high and new industrial development zones, Taiwan
investment zones, Singapore-Suzhou industrial park, tourist and resort zones.38
By the end of the 1990s, there were over 100 special areas. As a result of these
tax incentives, the effective tax rate for FIEs was about 10 percentage points
lower than that for domestic enterprises.
C. The Fall
So long as the FDI did not compete with Chinese firms, the most
effective way of using the tax system to attract FDI was to give it only to
foreign investors. 39 By the turn of the century, especially after China's accession
to the WTO in 2001, however, the FDI tax policy was under close scrutiny and
heatedly debated. The negative impact of such policy became more serious,
while the positive signalling, compensation and hospitality effects wore off as
China's investment conditions improved over time. The promulgation of the

35. The nominal tax rate was 33% (consisted of 30% national and 3% local).
For an overview of the tax implications for foreign investors, see Stephen C. Curley &
Darren R. Fortunato, Tax Considerations for Investors in China: A Preliminary Look,
20 N.C. J. Int'l L. & Com. Reg. 531 (1995); Jinyan Li, Tax Implications of Doing
Business in China, 43 Canadian Tax J. 75 (1995); and Kenny Z. Lin, Income Taxation
and Foreign Direct Investment in China, 25 Int'l Tax J. 78 (1999).
36. See Jiang, supra note 17, at 580-9.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. As discussed below, such differential policy resulted in round tripping.
However, round tripping was presumably not considered a serious problem because
China did not make it too difficult for those who did the round tripping. The alternative
would have been applying tax incentives to all taxpayers, which would be costly in
terms of revenue.
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Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) Law 4° on March 16, 2007 officially declared the
end of the existing FDI tax incentive regime. 4 '

III. EFFECTIVENESS,

EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY

IMPLICATIONS OF

TAx INCENTIVES

A. Overview
The tax incentives available to FDI are clearly in the nature of tax
expenditures. 42 They are assessed below in terms ofthe associated revenue loss,
their effectiveness in attracting FDI to China, and their efficiency and equity
implications in China.
For the purposes of this assessment, Chinese tax incentives are grouped
into the following categories: tax holidays,4 3 tax rate reductions in special
areas 4 or for profit from specified activities,45 and refund for reinvestment in
40. Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China, (EIT Law)
promulgated by the National People's Congress, Mar. 16, 2007. This law replaces the
two existing enterprise income taxes as of Jan. 1, 2008. The Chinese text of the law is
available at the State Administration of Taxation web site: www.chinatax.gov.cn. An
unofficial English translation is available at www.kpmg.com.cn and
www.lehmanlaw.com. For a discussion of this new law, see Jinyan Li, Fundamental
Enterprise Income Tax Reform in China: Motivations and Major Changes, (69) Bulletin
for International Fiscal Doc. (2007) 519.
41. The elimination of existing tax preferences and the increase in the general
tax rate for foreign-investment enterprises (FIEs) were feared for discouraging FDI in
China. To ease this fear, the new law allows existing FIEs to continue to pay as the
lower rate of 15% or 24% until 2013 or to enjoy other types of tax preferences (such as
tax holidays) until the specified time period is over. For existing FIEs that have not
started enjoying the tax holidays because they have not yet made any profits, the tax
holiday will start in 2008. In addition, State Council may decide to grandfather existing
tax preferences for newly-established hi-tech enterprises that receive priority support
from the State and are located in special zones (e.g. SEZs, Pudong New Area in
Shanghai, etc.), as well as tax preferential policies for enterprises the development of
which is encouraged in certain regions (such as the Western Region). EIT Law, Article
57.
42. The seminal works on this topic are Stanley Surrey, Pathways to Tax
Reform: The Concept of Tax Expenditures. Cambridge, MA. Harvard University Press
(1973); and Stanley Surrey and Paul McDaniel, Tax Expenditures. Cambridge, MA.
Harvard University Press (1985).
43. The standard tax holiday was three years (one year exemption and two
years half reduction), starting in the first profit-making year. An extended holiday often
years was available to FIEs engaged in low-profit operation s in farming and forestry
or located in remote, economically underdeveloped areas.
44. FIEs located in SEZs and some other special areas were taxable at a
reduced rate of 15% (as opposed to the general rate of 30%). Local tax was waived.
The tax holiday was extended to five years for "productive" enterprises (those
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China. 46 They are all profit-based tax incentives and, as such, do not generally
benefit the start-up companies that have losses in the initial stages, or innovative
companies that incur significant research and development expenses. While
most tax incentives were targeted at active business income, some were
applicable to investment income, most of which was received by foreign
investor in the form of dividends, interest or royalties.4 7
Chinese tax treaties 48 generally preserve the effect of domestic
incentives through a tax sparing clause. A tax sparing credit is found in treaties
with most capital exporting countries (with the notable exception of the United
States). 49 The effect of the tax sparing credit is that Chinese taxes waived or
reduced under Chinese law 50 are deemed to have been paid for the purposes of
engaged in manufacturing, communication and transport, agriculture, forestry, and
animal husbandry).
45. Additional tax incentives were available to export-oriented FIEs and
technologically-intensive FIEs, whether or not they were located in a special area. On
top of any tax exemption and reduction to which a taxpayer was entitled, the tax rate
was reduced to 15% in general and 10% in SEZs. Reinvestment in either type of
enterprises was eligible for a full refund of the tax paid on the reinvested profit. The tax
rate was reduced to 10% for FIEs in ETDAs or other areas where the enterprise income
tax rate was already 15%.
46. Tax is refunded to the investor if Chinese profits were reinvested in China.
The general rate of refund was 40%. In certain special cases, the rate was raised to
100%. In SEZs, refund for reinvestment was 100% as opposed to 40%.
47. The nominal 20% withholding tax was reduced to zero on dividends (or
distribution of profits) by FIEs, to zero or a lower rate for interest (mostly on loans
extended to Chinese state-owned banks) and royalties paid in respect of transfer of
advanced technology.
48. Since its first tax treaty with Japan in 1983, China has developed an
impressive network of bilateral tax treaties (85 treaties by the end of 2006). These
treaties generally follow the OECD Model Treaty and incorporate some elements of the
UN Model Treaty in order to protect source-based taxation. For a list and text of China's
treaties, see the State Administration ofTaxation's website: http://www.chinatax.gov.cn.
Because Hong Kong and Macao are "special administrative regions" and enjoy tax
autonomy, Mainland China concluded a "tax arrangement" with each of special region
to resolve any potential double taxation problem.
49. The tax sparing credit in some treaties has been phased out. For example,
the phasing out of the tax sparing credit under the China-United Kingdom Treaty was
provided under Article 5(1) of the Protocol concluded in 1996 to amend the China-UK
tax treaty (1984).
50. A typical tax sparing credit clause makes specific references to the Chinese
legislation that grants the tax reduction or exemption. Treaties concluded before 1991
refer to the EVJ Income Tax (1980) and the Foreign Enterprise Income Tax (1981) and
similar subsequent provisions that are agreed by the competent authorities to be of a
substantially similar character to those stipulated the treaty. The tax incentives granted
under the FIE Tax (1991) have been considered to be of a substantially similar. Because
the new Enterprise Income Tax Law (2007) retains the reductions and exemptions of
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determining the credit available in the other treaty country. For example, under
the China-Canada treaty, 5 1 Chinese withholding tax on dividends is deemed to
be 5%2 of the dividends paid even though the withholding tax rate is actually
5
zero.
B. Revenue Loss
The direct cost of the FDI tax incentives is the amount of revenue loss.
China has not published any official estimates on this cost or any other types of
tax expenditures. 53 The amount is believed to be significant; one scholar thought
the amount of revenue loss was as high as the amount of revenue collected.5 4 In
2003, while FIEs contributed
33.4% of national industrial output, they paid only
55
taxes.
total
of
20.9%
As discussed in more detail below, tax incentives also have indirect
costs resulted from creating significant opportunities for illicit behaviour by tax
withholding tax on dividends, interest and royalties available under the 1991 tax law,
it should be clear that the tax sparing credit applies to the new law.
51. For example, Article 21(2) of the China-Canada tax treaty:
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n480462/n480513/n481009/1017131 .html).
52. As far as Canadian tax is concerned, Chinese withholding tax on dividends
is creditable only in cases where the dividends are paid out of "taxable surplus" as
opposed to "exempt surplus." Because China is a designated treaty country, dividends
paid by FIEs to Canadian shareholders are mostly exempt dividends. As such, the tax
sparing credit for dividends is of limited practical effect.
53. The Ministry of Finance is in the process of establishing a team of experts
to study the issue of tax expenditures and develop models for assessments.
54. Quoqiang Ma, China's Current Tax Expenditure System: Issues and Policy
Options, in Hana Polackova Brixi, Christian M.A. Valenduc, and Zhicheng. L. Swiffi,
eds. Tax Expenditures - Shedding Light on Government Spending Through the Tas
System: Lessons From Developed and Transition Economies. Washington D.C. The
World Bank 190-202 at 197 (2004). Ma wrote that in terms of scale, "the cost of current
tax expenditures has reached - and even exceeded - the amount of total tax revenue
collected by the benchmark system.... The cost of income tax expenditures exceeds the
amount of income tax revenue." Chinese scholars have increasingly argued that the tax
incentive regimes in China are generous to a fault. See for example, Chun Chen,
Thoughts on China's Foreign Tax Incentives, no.7 Int'l Taxation in China 31-33 (in
Chinese) (2005); Zhiyuan Li, Building A Tax Expenditure System Suitable for China,
No.3, Taxation Research J. 40-42(in Chinese) (2006); Jiansuo Lu, A Brief Discussion
on the Sources of and Preventive Measures for Tax Revenue Loss, No. 9 Tax Research
J. 61-64 (in Chinese) (1999); and Zhiqiang Tang, Defects and Adjustments of Foreign
Tax Incentives, No. 10 Int'l Taxation in China 26-27 (in Chinese) (2005); and Jun Ye,
Discussion ofthe Need to Keep or Abolish Foreign Tax Incentives, no. 11 Int'l Taxation
in China 28-29(in Chinese) (2005).
55. Xue Sun, Possible Delay of Consolidating Enterprise Income Tax Laws to
2007, 21st Century Economics Tribune (January 10, 2005) at 6. See also SAT website
for the tax statistics: www.chinatax.gov.cn (in Chinese).
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administrators and taxpayers. The loss of economic efficiencies due to the
discriminative tax treatment of local businesses and barriers to fair competition
is also expected to be significant.
C. Effectiveness in Attracting FDI

There is a rich body of literature examining the factors that may affect
an investor's decision as to where to invest.56 According to the surveys of
investors in the 1960s to 1980s, "tax exemption is like a dessert; it is good to
have, but it does not help very much if the meal is not there., 57 In other words,
tax incentives are relevant, but not significant factors. At the same time, a
survey of government officials ranked tax incentives as key factors in attracting
FDI. 58 Evidence from the mid- 1980s to the end of 1990s showed, however, that
tax incentives "do affect the locational decisions of some investors some of the
time." 59 Tax incentives are considered to have 6"a
small but significant"
0
influence in attracting FDI to developing countries.

56. For an overview of the literature, see Paul R. McDaniel, The U.S Tax
Treatment of Foreign Source Income Earned in Developing Countries: A Policy
Analysis, 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 265 (2003); Yoram Margalioth, Tax Competition,
Foreign Direct Investments and Growth: Using the Tax System to Promote Developing
Countries, 23 Va. Tax Rev. 161 (2003); Avi Nov, Tax Incentives to Entice Foreign
Direct Investment: Should There Be a Distinction Between Developed Countries and
Developing Countries? 23 Va. Tax Rev. 685 (2004); - The Bidding War" to Attract
Foreign Direct Investment: The Need for a Global Solution, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 835
(2006). For economic literature, see David Wheeler & Ashoka Mody, International
Investment Location Decisions: The Case of U.S. Firms, 33 J. Int'l Econ. 57. (1992);
James R. Hines reached a contrary conclusion: Tax Policies and the Activities of
Multinational Corporations 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
5589, 1996). See also Michael P. Devereaux & Harold Freeman, The Impact of Tax on
Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence and the Implications for Tax Integration
Schemes, 2 Int'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 86 (1995); Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr.,
Foreign Direct Investment in a World of Multiple Taxes 8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 8440, 2001).
57. Jacques Morisset and Neda Pimia, How Tax Policy and Incentives Affect
Foreign Direct Investment: A Review, The World Bank and International Finance
Corporation Foreign Investment Advisory Service (December 2000), at 5.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See A.J. Easson, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment, Part I:
Recent Trends and Countertrends, 55 Bull. For Int'l Fiscal Documentation 266 (2001);
A.J. Easson, Taxation of Foreign Direct Investment: An Introduction (The Netherlands,
Kluwer) (1999); and McDaniel, supra note 56.
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China has experienced a tremendous growth in FDI inflow during the
past three decades and 6 1 is the largest recipient of FDI among developing
countries. During the same period of time, China has offered generous tax
incentives to FDI.62 These two facts tend to lead to the conclusion that China's
tax incentives seemed to have played a crucial role in attracting foreign
investment. 63 Most Chinese scholars consider tax incentives to be a relevant
factor.64 Some Chinese scholars 65 attribute the huge leap in the early 1990s, in
part, to the codification 66 of the existing tax incentives and the uniform
treatment of all forms of FDI. 67 International scholars generally share this
61. The annual value of FDI actually utilized in China is listed as follows: 4.1
billion U.S. dollars in 1979-84, 1.9 billion U.S. dollars in 1985,34.8 billion U.S. dollars
in 1990, 37.5 billion U.S. dollars in 1995, 40.7 billion U.S. dollars in 2000, and 60.3
billion U.S. dollars in 2005. Source: China statistical Year Book (2006):
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/R1814E.xls ,visited on July 10, 2007.
62. United Nations, World Investment Report 2006 (New York and Geneva
2006), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf.
63. Michael Littlewood, Tax Competition: Harmful to Whom? 26 Mith. J. Int'l
L. 411 (2004-5) at 475. See also Francesco D'Muri and Anna Marenzi, Tax Systems and
Tax Reforms in South and East Asia: Features and Effectives of Corporation Taxation
on FDI (July 2005), available at http://www.unipv.it/websiep/wp/409.pdf (visited Sept.
1, 2007), at 27.
64. See, for example, Gang Li and Guangyi Chen, Direction of Chinese
International Tax Law under WTO Principles, in Jianwen Liu, ed. Finance and Tax Law
Rev. Vol. 8. Beijing, China: Law Press China, (2006) 281, at 298 (in Chinese).
65. See Changjie Xia and Zhu Li, Tax Incentives and FDI: Theoretical
Analysis and China's Experience, No. 9 International Taxation in China, 53 (in Chinese)
(2004).
66. Other favourable tax developments include the conclusion of a bilateral tax
treaty over 40 countries that are the main sources of FDI in China, including Japan
(1983), the United States (1984), France (1984), the United Kingdom (1984), Belgium
(1985), Germany (1985), Malaysia (1985), Norway (1986), Denmark (1986), Singapore
(1986), Finland (1986), Canada (1986), Sweden (1986), New Zealand (1986), Thailand
(1986), Italy (1986), The Netherlands (1987), Poland (1988), Australia (1988),
Switzerland (1990), Cyprus (1990), Spain (1990), Romania (1991), Austria (1991),
Brazil (1991), Luxembourg (1994), Korea (1994), India (1994), Mauritius (1994). This
list of tax treaties is posted on the SAT's website: www.chinatax.gov.cn.
67. In China, tax legislation includes tax "laws" ("fa lu") enacted by the
National People's Congress (the legislature), "administrative regulations" (fa gui)
promulgated by the State Council (the government branch), as well as administrative
rules introduced by the State Administration of Taxation (SAT), which is a ministry of
the State Council. From the beginning of economic reforms, China has tried to
promulgate "laws" to govern FDI and other international activities. Examples are the
Joint Venture Law (1979) and the Joint Venture Income Tax Law (1980). In contrast,
domestic activities are regulated by "administrative regulations" or "administrative
rules." Examples are those governing the tax incentives for SEZs and other special areas
until 1991. Codifying these tax incentive measures into a "law" symbolizes the maturity
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assessment. For example, Tseng and Zebregs 68 list preferential investment
policies (including tax preferences) among the factors that have been most
important in influencing FDI in China. 69 Tung and Cho went further, arguing
that tax incentives are effective in attracting FDI to China.70 There is also an
apparent correlation between FDI and the Chinese location-specific and
activity-specific tax incentives.7 1 Over 70% of FDI has been in manufacturing.7
In 2005, 58.3% of total export was by enterprises receiving FDI (i.e., foreign
investment enterprises or FIEs).73 Over 80% of FDI in China was invested in
the coastal areas. 74 It is likely that most FDI projects enjoy some tax incentives.
However, using the FDI growth as a basis for asserting the effectiveness
of tax incentives is unreliable as it fails to identify the amount of FDI inflow
that would not have occurred in the absence of the tax incentives. On the other
of government policy, and thus creates more confidence of taxpayers in the certainty of
the measures.
68. Wanda Tseng and Harm Zebregs, Foreign Direct Investment in China:
Some Lessons for Other Countries, IMF Policy Discussion Paper PDP/02/03 (2003),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/pdp/2002/pdp03.pdf.
69. For a similar conclusion, see Leonard K. Cheng and Yum K. Kwan, What
are the Determinants of the Location of Foreign Direct Investment? The Chinese
Experience, (E. Asian Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 174, 2000),
available at http://www.eaber.orglintranet/documents/23/174/CUHKCheng_99_5.pdf.
70. Samuel Tung and Stella Cho, The Impact of Tax Incentives on Foreign
Direct Investment in China, 9(2) J. of Int'l Accounting, Auditing & Tax'n 105-135
(2000). See also Littlewood, supra note 63.
71. Guangping Lei, Implications of Enterprise Income Tax Reform for
Utilization of FDI, No.4, Tax'n Res. J. 35 at 36 (in Chinese) (2006). See also Zhang and
Liu, infra note 85; and Xia and Li, supra note 65.
72. See China Statistics Year Book (2006), available at
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2006/html/Rl817E.xls, (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
73. Id. In comparison, the share of total industrial output by FIEs was less than
35% of the national industrial output, which means that FIEs export more than Chinesefunded enterprises. See Jean-Claude Berthelemy and Sylvie Demurger, Foreign Direct
Investment and Economic Growth: Theory and Application to China, 4 Rev. Dev.
Econ. 140 (2000).
74. Xiaojuan Jiang, Yingxin Wang, and Laike Yang, A Study of the Gradual
Shift of Foreign Investment, Chinese Econ. Sept.-Oct. 2004, at 19, 19-24. Chen, Chun
Reflections on the matter of Foreign Tax Preferences, No.7 Int'l Tax'n China 31-33 (in
Chinese) (2005). On the other hand, there are obvious non-tax factors that are attractive
to FDI: the special areas in the East Coast generally have a longer history of open to
investors, better infrastructure, more open, transparent and efficient local government,
better educated workforce and higher purchasing power. Tai-Yuen Hon, Che-Cheong
Poon & Kai-Yin Woo, Regional Distribution of Foreign Direct Investment in China: A
Multivariate Data Analysis of Major Socioeconomic Variables, Chinese Econ. Mar.Apr. 2005, at 56 (a fundamental determinant of regional disparity in FDI in China
during 1998-2003 was the overall socioeconomic environment in the administrative
regions).
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hand, there is no available data showing the relevance of various factors,
including tax incentives, in influencing the locational decisions of foreign
investors. It seems that more weight was given to tax incentives than what
actually happened. For example, the Shanghai Pudong experience has been
offered as proof that tax incentives worked, while in fact almost all the real
investment in terms of factories was outside the Pudong zone and paid no
Chinese tax anyway as a result of transfer pricing.7 5 The apparent correlation
between the location of FDI in China's coastal areas and the location-specific
tax incentives is also misleading as evidence of the effectiveness of tax
incentives. The general investment environment in coastal areas has been more
inductive to investment than the rest of China. Since most exports are
competitive on labour costs and low-level of regulation regarding pollution,
labour protection, health and safety controls, it's possible that labour-intensive,
export-oriented investment would have taken place anyway.
According to a survey of companies in the European Union about the
factors influencing their decision to invest in China,76 91% of investors put
investment incentives on medium or higher position when deciding to invest,
and 41% considered incentives as highly important factors.77 To the extent that
tax incentives influence a foreign investor's decision, the influence seems to
vary in terms of the time of investment, origin of the FDI, the size of the
investor, and the investor's strategy in China.78
Early years - Generally speaking, tax incentives were more relevant
during the early years when the signalling, compensation and cultural effect was
most evident. Once the tax incentive regime was firmly in place, it became a
constant factor and had much less influence. For example, following China's
accession to the WTO in 2001, the fate of FDI tax incentives was publicly
debated in China, 79 but, in spite of the uncertainty and possible elimination of
the incentives, FDI continued to increase in China.
Home country taxation - In terms of the origin of FDI, Chinese tax
incentives are more attractive to investors based in low-tax jurisdictions. These
investors stand to benefit from the Chinese tax incentives as Chinese tax is the
75. This example is based on conversations between Rick Krever and Chinese
tax officials while during one of his trips to China.
76. Wenhua Shan, Law and Foreign Investment in China: General Role ofLaw
and Substantive Issues (Part One), Manchester J. Int'l Econ. L. Issue 3 (2005) at 41.
77. Id., at 54.
78. This is consistent with the finding by Easson that once a multinational
enterprise has decided to invest in a given region, then tax incentives can influence the
location of the FDI within the region; Easson (2001), supra note 60, at 267.
79. Li and Chen, supra note 64; Hong Guo, Principles and Directions of
China's Foreign Tax Incentives, No. 11 Tax Res. J. 14-18 (in Chinese) (2005);
Guoqiang Ma, Current Chinese Tax Incentives: Problems and Suggestions, Tax Res. J.
34-38 (in Chinese) (2003); Jiang Liang, Problems with China's Current Tax Incentives
for Science and Technology, No. 10, Tax Res. J. 35-38 (in Chinese) (2001).
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only tax payable. But of course, some low-tax countries (such as Samoa and
British Virgin Islands) act as funnels for capital from high-tax developed
countries. As we will explain below, tax havens have been used by Chinese
investors for round-tripping funds. To that extent, there has been no increase in
investment but mere recharacterisation of the source to avoid Chinese tax.
Investors from "exemption" jurisdictions seem to react more positively
to Chinese tax incentives than those from "credit" jurisdictions.8 0 For example,
companies from continental Europe (typically with exemption system that does
not tax foreign-source business income) place higher importance on incentives
than their counterparts in the United Kingdom (a credit system).8 ' Investors
from credit jurisdictions, especially those that do not grant tax sparing credit
(notably the United States) maybe indifferent to the Chinese tax incentives if
they have to distribute profits to the United States8 2 or channel their FDI
through a tax haven entity.8 3 It is possible that a portion of the FDI from8 Japan
4
is attributable to the tax sparing credit under the China-Japan tax treaty.
Size of investors - Large multinational enterprises are found to be less
85

influenced by Chinese tax incentives than small and medium sized firms.

80. For a case study of the relevance of home country taxation, see Chad
Leechor and Jack M. Mintz, Taxing Foreign Income in Capital-Importing Countries:
Thailand's Perspective, (Country Econ. Dep't, The World Bank, Working Paper No.
WPS -0499, 1990), available at http://go.worldbank.orgB6UOYYHSXO. See Timonthy
J. Goodspeed, Taxation and FDI in Developed and Developing Countries (2004),
available at http://isp-aysps.gsu.edu/academics/conf2004/Goodspeed.pdf. (last visited
Jan. 15, 2008) (reviewing the literature on the theoretical incentive effects of hostcountry taxes on FDI coming from tax credit countries).
81. Shan, supra note 76, at 55.
82. There seems to be only very a small difference in the impact of investment
incentives resulting from territorial versus worldwide system. See Goodspeed, supra
note 80.
83. Lei, supra note 70, at 36.
84. For further research, see Celine Azemar and Andrew Delios, (2005); Fiscal
Incentives in Developing Countries and FDI: Tax Sparing Matters (Apr. 2005),

available at http://www.afse.fr/docs/congres_2005/docs2OO5/Azemar.pdf(visited Nov.
16, 2007); Celine Azemar, Rodolphe Desbordes and Jean-Louis Mucchielli, Do Tax
Sparing Agreements Contribute to the Attraction of FDI in Developing Countries?,
available at ftp://mse.univ-paris 1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2004/Bla04047.pdf, James Hines,
Jr., Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries, Nat'l Bureau Econ.

Research Working Paper No. 6728 (1998), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w6728.
85. Yang Zhang and Hui Liu, Analysis of the Impact of Taxation on FDI, No.4,
Tax'n Res. J. 39 at 41 (in Chinese) (2006). Shan, supra note 76, also made this
conclusion in his empirical study. Shan notes that tax incentives were regarded as an
important FDI location factor on the basis of the number of investors surveyed.
However, the "widely held assumption that western investors do not care much about
incentives" remains valid as it reflects the opinions and experiences of large
multinationals, which accounts for the vast majority among international investors in
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Presumably, multinationals are more interested in the long-term investment
environment than the short-term effect of tax incentives. They can use tax
planning techniques to achieve an effective tax rate target which is much lower
than the formal tax rate. Large multinational companies are also more likely to
receive special tax treatments because of their bargaining
positions. Small
86
investors are generally more responsive to tax incentives.
Business strategy in China - Investors who are lured to China by its
domestic market, such as retail, telecom, banking, services, and certain
consumer products are less affected by tax incentives. FDI in the extractive
sectors is located in China because of the natural resources. "Real" long-term
investment in human capital and technological innovation rather than assembly
manufacturing does not generate immediate taxable income so tax holidays or
tax rate reductions have no effect on it. In fact, the lion's share of FDI in car
manufacturing or other types of long-term -projects are not actually located in
the special areas that benefit from tax incentives, but in places where there is a
strong existing manufacturing base (Tianjin, Wuhan, Shanghai, Shenyang, and
Chongqing. ' 87 In contrast, investors looking for low-cost manufacturing bases
tend to react more positively to Chinese tax incentives. For example, most
investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan invest
in these types of projects and
88
factor.
important
an
incentives
tax
considered
D. Efficiency and Economic Development
There appears to be two normative arguments about the efficiency of
FDI tax incentives. First, tax incentives distort behaviour and are thus
inefficient. 89 Second, tax incentives are not inefficient as long as they overcome
90
market failures and compensate foreign investors for positive externalities.
terms of the amount of their investment, but a tiny minority in terms of their number.
Id. at 55.
86. For studies on this topic, see E.J. Coyne, An Articulated Analysis Model
for FDI Attraction into Developing Countries, Florida; Nova Southeastern University
(1994), reviewed by Morisset and Pirnia, supra note 57.
87. See David Bartlett, China's rise as a global manufacturing power, GEC
Executive Brief, May 2003, at http://globaleconomics.net/graphics/ChinaMFG.pdf.
88. Kevin Honglin Zhang, Why Does so much FDI from Hong Kong and
Taiwan go to Mainland China? (16) China Economic Rev. 293-307 (2005).
89. See UN, The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment: A Survey of the
Evidence, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/121, UN. Sales No. E.92.II.A.2. (1992); Tax Incentives
and Foreign Direct Investment: A Global Survey U.N. Doc. CTAD/ITE/IPC/Misc. 3,
U.N. Sales no. E.01.Il.D.5 (2000); OECD, Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: The
Experience of the Economies of Transition. Paris, OECD (1995). Economists tend to
argue that state intervention in the form of tax subsidies distorts the efficient allocation
of resources through price and market mechanisms. For a survey of these views, see
Margalioth, supra note 84; and Nov. (2006), supra note 56, at 842-4.
90. Margalioth, id., at 182.
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The second argument is more persuasive in the Chinese context. FDI tax
incentives aim at influencing foreign investors' decision in order to attract
9
investment to China. Since "tax incentives are meant to distort behaviour," '
they are deliberate violations of neutrality. Like other types of tax expenditures,
it is inappropriate to evaluate FDI tax incentives under the normative theory of
neutrality or efficiency. Instead, efficiency is better assessed by examining the
type of investors' behaviour induced by the incentives and the extent to which
the incentives worsen, as opposed to, overcome market failures.
Positive externalities of FDI - FDI tax incentives were intended to
attract FDI that would not have come to China otherwise. To the extent that the
FDI attracted by tax incentives entails positive externalities, 92 the incentives are
efficient. Positive externalities of FDI in general are much in evidence. FDI has
been considered to be the "engine" of China's rapid economic growth: FIEs
contributed to about 0.4 percentage points to China's annual GDP growth
during the 1990s,93 helped China build a highly competitive and dynamic
manufacturing sector for exports, 94 and affected China's economic growth
through the diffusion of idea and transfer of technology. 95 The jobs created by
FIEs in urban areas quadrupled between 1991 and 1999 to a total of 6 million,
accounting for 3% of China's urban employment. 96 Because FDI was an
important source of China's97economic growth, it is a powerful force for general
poverty reduction in China.
As discussed above, however, it is unclear as to the extent of FDI that
was actually attracted by tax incentives. It is thus difficult to ascertain how
efficient tax incentives are. Meanwhile, the choice of tax incentive instruments
and the difficulties of administering these instruments in a transitional economy
provide investors with opportunities to take advantage of, or abuse, these tax
incentives. To the extent that these FDI-specific tax incentives encourage tax
avoidance or evasion without generating any real increase in economic
activities, they clearly have a negative impact on the economy.
"Round tripping" - Chinese tax incentives have been granted only to
As expected, this has resulted in a significant degree of
"foreign" investors.
"round tripping." 98 Chinese laws do not define "foreign" in any substantive
manner. A company is "foreign" as long as its place of registration is outside
91. Id., at 182.
92. Id., at 183.
93. Tseng and Zebregs, supra note 68.
94. Id. See also Zhang Tao, Utilization of Foreign Capital and Economic
Growth in China, vol. 37, no. 1 The Chinese Economy 62-84 (Jan.-Feb. 2004).
95. See Stephane Dees, Foreign Direct Investment in China: Determinants and
Effects, 31 Economics of Planning 175-94 (1998).
96. Tseng and Zebregs, supra note 68.
97. Kevin Zhang, supra note 88.
98. Easson argued that such round-tripping may happen whenever tax
incentives are given only to foreign investors: Easson, supra note 60, at 367.
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Mainland China. Chinese investors, who would otherwise pay tax at least 10%
higher than FIEs, have been motivated to engage in round tripping. The
People's Daily9 9 reported:
The British Virgin Islands is a major destination for China's
offshore investment.... 10,000 out of 500,000 companies there
are from China. Most China-originated money entering tax
havens will re-enter China as "foreign investment," - "round
tripping." ... A closer examination of China's star foreign
direct investment (FDI) figures reveal a large amount of capital
going out of the country and returning under a different guise.
The World Bank and other experts have estimated the scale of
this round tripping could be as large as 20% to 30% of the total
FDI inflow into China, but there is no clear definition and
detailed estimation method behind the numbers.... Even worse
is that the trend is growing bigger.... The biggest pay-off for
recycling mainland-originated money through a web of
companies offshore is the tax concessions that China grants to
foreign firms.
Round tripping clearly distorts the investment behaviour of Chinese
investors. Since the capital is originated from China, the positive externalities
expected of genuine FDI could not occur.100 Moreover, round tripping makes
a mockery of the Chinese tax system by circumventing the law in a "glorified"
manner. Round tripping also distorts data on FDI in China, which may not only
influence the effectiveness and official management of China's FDI utilization,
but also bring risks to China's financial system. 101
Perenniallosses or 'footloose" investors - The tax holiday for "new"
FIEs starts in the first year of making a profit. Chinese researchers found that
many FIEs postpone reporting a profit in China by "surplus stripping"
techniques (such as paying royalties, management fees and excessive interest

99. China Daily, Investment outflows to tax havens, People's Daily Online,
Jun. 22, 2004, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200406/22/eng20040622_147138.html
(visited Jul. 31, 2007).
100. The World Bank and other agencies and experts have estimated that
the scale of this round tripping could be as high as a quarter of the total FDI inflows
into PRC: World Bank (2002), Global Development Finance 2002, available at
www.worldbank.org. For more discussion. see Geng Xiao, Round-Tripping Foreign
Direct Investment in the People's Republic of China: Scale, Causes and Implications,
at http://www.adbi.org/discussion-paper/2004/06/01/450.prc.foreign.direct.
investment (2004) (visited Jul. 31, 2007).
101. China Daily, supra note 99.
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to foreign related companies) or transfer pricing. 10 2 In this way, the FIE can use
the tax holiday when the profit and income tax are significant. Otherwise, the
tax holiday would begin in the first-year of profit, irrespective of the amount of
tax saved.
Tax holidays begin as soon as a FIE taxpayer becomes profitable and
expire at the end of the specified period. They primarily benefit short-term
investments, which often are undertaken by "footloose" companies that quickly
disappear from one location to reappear in another. The tax holidays also tend
to reward the establishment of a FIE, rather than investment in an existing
enterprise. Chinese researchers found that many FIEs terminate an investment
in order to start a "new" investment as soon as the tax holiday is over.' 0 3 About
one quarter of all FEs registered since 1979 were believed to have paid no
income tax because, among others, the investment was terminated after the tax
holiday.1°4 This, in part, explains the somewhat puzzling phenomenon that
foreign companies keep investing in China "irrespective of short-term
profitability."' 5 The transaction costs associated with open and close of FIEs
have no economic benefits other than saving taxes.
Administrative inefficiencies - There are efficiency costs associated
with the administration of FDI tax incentives. It is widely recognized in China
that FDI tax incentives are misused and abused at local levels.'0 6 Tax incentive
legislation provides a great deal of discretion to local tax authorities to approve
tax incentives. 107 The lack of transparency and accountability in administering
102. See, for example, Chunshan Wu, The Use of Tax Havens and Their
Prevention, No.10, Int'l Taxation in China, 25-26 (P.R.C.) (1998); and Jun Ye, An
Examination of the Reasons for Keeping or Abolishing FDI Tax Incentives, No. 11,
Int'l Taxation in China 28-29 (P.R.C.) (2005).
103. Wu, id.; and Wei Tie, An Evaluation of the Causes for Tax Avoidance
under Current Law, No. 11, Int'l Taxation in China 32-34 (P.R.C.) (1999).
104. Sun, supra note 55. This is consistent with international evidence on
the use of tax holidays; see Morisset and Pimia, supra note 57, at 12-13.
105. Littlewood, supra note 63, at 476.
106. See, for example, Tingxu Li, Means of Tax Avoidance and Tax
Evasion by Foreign Investment Enterprises and Prevention Measures, No.8, Int'l Tax
J. of China 62-64 (P.R.C.) (1999); Wei Tie, Causes and Assessment of Tax
Avoidance under Current Tax System, No. 11, Int'l Taxation in China 32-34 (P.R.C.)
(2005); and Jun Ye, To Repeal or Not to Repeal of Foreign Tax Incentive Policies,
No.1 1, Int'l Tax J. of China 28-29 (P.R.C.) (2005).
107. For example, Article 8 of the 1991 FIE and Foreign Enterprise Income
Tax Law states: "Any enterprise with foreign investment which is engaged in
agriculture, forestry or animal husbandry and any other enterprise with foreign
investment which is established in remote underdeveloped areas may, upon approval
by the competent department for tax affairs under the State Council of an application
filed by the enterprise, be allowed a 15% to 30% reduction of the amount of income
tax payable for a period of 10 years ..."
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08
tax incentive legislation tend to lead to graft, corruption and rent seeking.'
Local governments have also engaged in fierce tax
competition by lobbying the
9
Central Government for more tax preferences.'
Market Failuresand tax discrimination- China introduced FDI tax
incentives to, in part, compensate investors for the lack of market or investment
conditions. During the early years of reform, these incentives played a positive
role in attracting investment, which, in turn, promoted the development of a
market mechanism in China and propelled economic growth. In this sense, the
tax incentives were efficient, but only as long as the FDI was separate from
domestic enterprises. The dual track system was the product of China's
evolutionary approach to economic reforms. The domestic track was
evolutionary, allowing gradual reform of state-owned enterprises and the
creation of a market mechanism. 110 During the early periods of economic
reforms, there were significant market failures and the internal tax policy had
strong traits of the command economy. FIEs were regulated more by market
principles than government plans. Direct competition with local enterprises on
the Chinese market was limited.
The dual track system was difficult to maintain when FIEs were
allowed greater access to the Chinese internal market, especially after China's
accession to the WTO in 2001. Foreign firms have been gradually allowed to
own up to 50% of enterprises in sensitive industries, such as telecom, banking
and insurance industries. Multinational companies have taken over Chinese
companies in a quest for economies of scale. The FDI tax incentives have aided
such foreign take-overs. In 2006, foreign investors controlled the majority of

108. See Shang-Jin Wei, Does Corruption Relieve Foreign Investors of the
Burden of Taxes and Capital Controls? (The World Bank Dev. Research Group,
Working Paper No. 2209, 1999). Zdenek Drabek & Warren Payne, (The Impact of
Transparency on Foreign Direct Investment,) (World Trade Org. Econ. Research and
Analysis Div., Working Paper No. 99-02.
109. Li and Chen, supra note 64; Jiang Liang, China's current Tax
Preferences of High-Tech and the Problems, No.10, Tax Research J. 35-38 (P.R.C.)
(2001).
110. This policy seemed to have contributed positively to the success of
economic reforms at earlier stages. The domestic track was considered highly
successful in complementing the structural reforms of state-owned enterprises
(SOEs). A main goal in internal economic reforms was to restructure SOEs to
become economically efficient entities. Replacing the previous profit-delivery
mechanisms under the command economy with tax payments helped SOEs and their
government regulators to recognize the new relationship between the enterprises and
the government. It also provided economic incentives for SOEs to be more profitable
as they can keep the after-tax profits. The tax system brought some "objective"
assessment of the performances of SOEs. Another goal in internal economic reforms
was to gradually allow the development of the private sector, which was previously
viewed suspiciously in ideological terms. By taxing the profits of private enterprises,
the government legitimized the private sector.
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assets in 21 out of 28 major industrial sectors." 11Given the large amount of FDI
in China, domestically-funded companies are facing tax discrimination in
addition to the challenges resulting from multinational firm's control and
market power on the Chinese market. The potential dominance of key economic
sectors by multinational firms, assisted by the tax system, became a serious
concern." 2 Chinese-owned enterprises started to cry for "national treatment"
from their own government. The Minister of Finance, Jin, Renqing,
acknowledged
this in his explanation of the draft law to the National People's
3
Congress:"1
Great changes have taken place in China's economy and
society, and the socialist market economy has initially taken
shape. With China's accession to the WTO, the Chinese
domestic market has been further open to foreign capital;
domestic enterprises have gradually integrated themselves into
the world economy and are facing ever-increasing competition.
If different tax policies continued to be implemented for
domestic and foreign-funded enterprises, the former would
definitely be put at a competitive disadvantage and the
establishment of a unified market with standardized and fair
competition would be obstructed.
Therefore, FDI tax incentives that had the effect of overcoming market
failures in the late 1970s and 1980s became barriers to market-based
competition in the late 1990s and 2000s. With the gradual improvement in
market conditions, the incentive measures became less efficient.
E. Equity in China
Compared to the efficiency aspect of FDI tax incentives, the equity and
redistribution effect of FDI tax incentives has received much less attention in
tax literature. 14 In theory, the redistributive effect of FDI tax incentives exists
111. Weigan Shi, A Reexamination of the Role of Foreign Investors (Sept.
1, 2006), available at. http://finance.sina.com.cn (P.R.C.).
112. See Hung-Gay Fung, Julius H. Johnson, Jr., and Yanda Xu, (Winners
and Losers: Foreign Firms in China's Emerging Market,) The Chinese Econ. May,
2004, at 5-16.
113. Jin Renqing, P.R.C. Fin Minister, Explanation on Draft Enterprise
Income Tax Law, The full text of the speech in English is available at
http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t30222l.htm (visited Jul. 31, 2007).
114. For a discussion of the equity aspect of tax competition, see Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax
Competition, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371 (2004); Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion:
Another Perspective on International Tax Competition, 89 Geo. L. J. 543 (2001). For
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if they result in shifting part of the tax burden from mobile to relatively
immobile factors and from income to consumption." 5
In China's case, such redistributive effect is barely noticeable. China's
tax structure has always relied on consumption taxes as a main source of
revenue: the Value-added Tax (VAT) and other sales taxes generate more than
two-thirds of total tax revenue; income taxes collected from enterprises and
individuals generate about 22% of total tax revenue.11 6 The tax policy towards
FDI has not affected the overall design of the Chinese tax structure. The tax
structure in China cannot, by design, play a key role in alleviating inequality in
income and wealth. In developed countries, personal income tax has been used
as the main instrument for redistributing income. 1 7 In China, the role of
progressive personal income tax in redistribution remains largely symbolic at
the moment; the Individual Income Tax" 18 is the only
progressive tax in China,
19
accounting for less than 6 %of total tax revenue.'
a critique of the role of Miranda Stewart and Sunita Jogarajan, The International
Monetary Fund and Tax Reform, British Tax Review (2004) 146-175 (2004); and
Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Disclosure of Tax Reform
in Developing and Transition Countries, 44 Harv. Int'l L, J. 134, 140-190 (2003).
115. These two aspects are listed as evidence of harmful effects of
"preferential tax regimes" in the OECD Harmful Tax Competition Report. Paris,
OECD (1998), 23.
116. Nat'l Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005. Beijing, China: Finance
Press at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/htmli/HO803e.htm. The VAT and
turnover taxes have some progressive features. For example, the Consumption Tax is
imposed on luxury goods and services at progressive rates. This tax is presumably
bome by high-income earners. The VAT is slightly progressive with a lower rate on
certain necessities (e.g., grain and edible oil, running water). Overall however, these
taxes worsen the urban/rural disparities as low-income rural residents much pay
these taxes. In many poor rural areas, these taxes are the only taxes collected. See
Tao Ran and Mingxing Liu, Urban and Rural Household Taxation in China:
Measurement, Comparison and Policy Implications,(10) No.4 J. of the Asia Pacific
Economy 486-505 (2005).
117. See Richard M. Bird and Eric M. Zolt, Redistribution via Taxation:
The Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing Countries, (52) UCLA
L. Rev. 1627 (2005).
118. The Individual Income Tax Law has been amended on October 31,
1993, Aug. 30, 1999, and Oct. 27, 2005.
119. This is not much different from the role of personal income tax in other
developing countries. See Bird and Eric Zolt, supra note 117. Although still an
insignificant source of revenue for the government, the amount of revenue increased
rapidly: it grew by more than 6 times between 1980 (CNYO. 1 million, accounting for
less than 1% of total tax revenue) and 2004 (CNY173,700 million): see State
Administration of Taxation, Tax Statistics, (Apr. 20, 2006), www.chinatax.gov.cn. It
is progressive only with respect to employment income and business income as other
types of income are taxable at a flat rate. The fraction of population paying the tax
grew from 0.1% of all wage earners in 1986 to 32% of all wage earners in 2001 and
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Chinese tax policy has not played any significant role in promoting
social development or redistribution of income.1 20 China's goal is to develop a
"Xiaokang society" in which "people generally are not rich but have adequate
food, clothing, and other material belongings necessary for a decent life.' 21
Economic development is a precondition for reaching this goal. 122 The
efficiency and economic growth objectives of tax policy have been largely
divorced from the equity and redistribution objectives of tax policy. The FDI
tax incentives cannot be blamed for failing to promote redistributive justice in
China as they were not intended as such.

the average amount of annual tax paid by each wage earner was CNY314 (less than
USD40) in 2002. More than one-third of the total lIT on employment income was
collected from workers at FIEs. Given the current situations in China, the Individual
Income Tax cannot be a meaningful tool of redistribution. For further discussion, see
Thomas Piketty and Nancy Qian, Income Inequality and Progressive Income
Taxation in China and India,
1986-2001,
available
at
http://www.econ.brown.edu/fac/NancyQian/Papers/
PikettyQian2004.pdf (2004); Jinyan Li, The Chinese Individual Income Tax: A 26Year Old Infant. 43 Tax Notes Int'l, 297; Hua Shi, Changes in the lIT Revenue
Composition, No.4 China Taxation 4-6 (P.R.C.) (2004); Frontier Tax Policy Study in
China. Beijing, China: China Taxation Press, at 344 (2003).
120. China has achieved social development in certain areas. For example,
according to the United Nations report, China's human development index improved
continuously in the past 20 years, from 0.557 in 1980 to 0.755 in 2003 and China's
global ranking rose from 101st in 1991 to 85th in 2003. On the other hand, there
have been increasing income disparities, regional disparities, and urban and rural
disparities. For example, in 2002, per capita GDP in East China was CNY12,266, but
only CNY5,144 in Southwest. Within the Southwest region, urban per capita GDP
was CNY6,304, and rural per capita GDP was only CNY1,744. Women, children,
and racial minorities are generally disadvantaged disproportionately.
121. United Nations Dev. Programme & china Dev. Research Fund. China
Human Development Report 2005, available at http://www.undp.org.cn at 1.
122. This is not much different from the "Asian path" to development:
Pareerboom (2005), supra note 9. In 2005, however, the new leadership put forward
the concept of scientific development and the concept of harmonious society to guide
reforms. This was the first time that China took a more comprehensive approach
towards development. Social development is elevated to complement economic
development. The concept of harmonious society stresses the need to reconcile
conflicts between rural and urban areas and between different social groups to
promote social stability. It is linked to the notions of social welfare and more equal
income distribution and to the rule of law. This new comprehensive approach has not
been reflected in tax policy. This part of the paper examines the relationship between
tax policy and social development. Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, Report
on the Work of Government, Third Session, 10th National People's Congress and
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, Mar. 5, 2005.
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IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

A. Overview
China's experiment with FDI-specific tax incentives presents some
interesting issues for international tax debates. It is true that China is different
from many other developing countries because of its sheer size: the world's
largest recipient of FDI, fourth largest economy, and third largest trader.123 As
a market-maker, China is perhaps more capable of escaping the "prisoner's
dilemma"'124 that smaller, open developing countries tend to fall victim to.
Meanwhile, China has paid close attention to international tax norm and
followed the advice of international experts when they are suitable to China's
conditions.125 The increasing integration of the Chinese economy with the world
economy has made it increasingly important for China to care about tax policy
of other countries and for other countries to care about China's. The
implications of the Chinese experience are discussed below in terms of the
choice of tax policy instruments in attracting FDI, harmful effects on other
countries, and inter-nation equity and redistribution.
B. Choice of Tax Instrumentfor Attracting FDI
Taxpolicy matters- China's experience challenges "a widely held view
that tax incentives of all sorts have proved to be largely ineffective, while

123. For a detailed discussion of FDI flows, see World Investment Report,
http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intltemlD= 1485&lang= 1
124. The prisoner's dilemma is a game theory. It is a type of non-zero-sum
game in which two players may each "cooperate" with or "defect" (i.e. betray) the
other player. In the classic form of this game, no matter what the other player does,
one player will always gain a greater payoff by playing defect. Since in any situation
playing defect is more beneficial than cooperating, all rational players will play
defect. In the context of tax competition, this theory holds that even if all countries
participating in the competition knows that they are collectively better off by
cooperating with one another by refraining from granting tax incentives, no country
wanted to do that for fear that other countries won't follow. So, every country chose
to "defect." According to Shaviro, the number of articles in U.S. and Canadian law
reviews mentioning prisoner's dilemmas was 837 over a five-year period ended in
June 2006. See Daniel Shaviro, Why Worldwide Welfare as a Normative Standard in
U.S. Tax Policy? (N.Y.U. L. Sch. Law & Econ. Research Paper Services Woring
Ppaer No. 07-12; http://wwwrn.comabstract=966256 (2007).
125. In the late 1970s, when advised by international experts that granting
tax incentives was not a good idea China ignored it. During early 2000s, when
China's internal conditions require it, similar international advice became heeded to
and FDI tax incentives were replaced with a general lower corporate tax rate.
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causing serious distortions and inequities in corporate taxation."' 126 During the
earlier years of Chinese reforms, FDI tax incentives were generally considered
effective as they helped China overcome some investment hurdles (market
failures and lack of ideal institutional investment environment), send a signal
of welcoming foreign investment, and entice overseas Chinese to invest in
China. As a temporary measure, FDI tax incentives played a role in jumpingstart China's economic development. 127 The overall effect, however, has been
mixed. When domestic market conditions and institutional settings improved,
the FDI tax policy became less effective and less efficient.
The Chinese experience also shows the importance of tax competition.
In the age of globalization, the cross-border mobility of capital limits a
country's freedom in taxing capital. Even though tax-policy making remains a
hallmark of national sovereignty, few countries can afford to ignore the
international competitiveness of their tax policy.' 28 China is no exception. To
be competitive, China used FDI-specific incentives in the past and will use a
generally lower corporate
tax rate in the future.' 29 A general low tax rate is, in
130
itself, an incentive.
From FDIspecific incentives to general low rate - The promulgation

of the EIT Law that adopts an universal tax rate for all enterprises, irrespective
of they receive FDI, represents a major shift in Chinese tax policy from a
temporary, transitional mode to a mature, outward-looking mode. It moves the

126. Janet Stotsky, Summary of IMPF Tax Policy Advice, in Tax Policy
Handbook 279, 282 (Parthasarathi Shome ed., 1995).
127. In this sense, China's experience is generally consistent with that of
Singapore. See Johan Deprez, The Telecommunications Industry in the Information
Age: A Case Study in Globalization, Deregulation, and Tax Competition, 23 Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 537 (2001); N. Jerold Cohen, ABA Members Comment
on Runaway Plant Proposal, 96 TNT 150-31 (May 31, 1996); Terrence R. Chorvat,
Book Review: A Different Perspective on Tax Competition, 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L.
Rev. 501 (2003); How Teck Tan, Singapore's Tax Treaty Policy, 29 Intertax 184
(2001) (examining Singapore's use of tax incentives).
128. H. David Rosenbloom, Sovereignty and the Regulation of International
Business in the Tax Area, 20 Can.-U.S. L.J. 267 (1994). No area of the law is closer
to the subject of sovereignty than taxation. As long as diversity of culture, economy,
political and fiscal factors leads countries to pursue a wide range of income tax
systems, countries will try their best to preserve their tax sovereignty. For a further
discussion on the implications of globalization for tax policy, see John P. Steines, Jr.,
Income Tax Implications of Free Trade, 49 Tax L. Rev. 675 (1994).
129. See Margalioth, supra note 56; Ireland is often cited as a success story
with its generally low corporate tax rate. The OECD also makes a distinction
between tax competition in the form of generally applicable lower tax rates and tax
regimes designed to attract FDI: OECD 1998 and OECD 2000, infra note 178.
130. Moriset and Pimia, supra note 57, at 12.
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Chinese tax system closer to international tax norm.t 31 Tax neutrality is one of
the important principles underlying the reform.' 32 Several domestic and
international factors seem to have influenced China's decision to abolish FDI
tax incentives and to adopt a generally lower corporate income tax rate.
Domestically, the Chinese government decided in 2005 to upgrade
China's economic development model from that of FDI-led manufacturing and
export to one of a technology-driven, sustainable economic development.133 The
existing tax incentives were geared to promote the former model of
development and were thus outdated. By 2007, the Central Government's fiscal
position had been relatively strong to afford the general reduction of corporate
tax rate. The increasing integration of FDI with the domestic economy made it
very difficult for the government to justify preferential tax policy towards FDI.
There were also serious doubts about the effectiveness of tax incentives in
attracting "real" foreign investment to China that help China develop a
sustainable economy.
Internationally, China's accession to the WTO had tremendous impact.
Because China must allow foreign investors to have access to the Chinese
market, domestic enterprises were exposed to international competition and
were at risk of losing out to multinational corporations. The FDI tax incentives
further aid foreign companies in competing with Chinese companies. Such
"supra national treatment" was certainly not required by the WTO. Chinese
businesses seized the opportunity to lobby the government to end tax
discrimination. Another source of international influence is Ireland's economic
success.134 Adopting the Irish model will "kill two birds with one stone" by
ending tax discrimination against domestic companies and maintaining China's
131. Jin, supra note 113. In explaining the draft law to the National People's
Congress, the Minister of Finance identified the following as guiding principles for
the new law: equal taxation of all enterprises at the rate of 25%; the promotion of
overall, sustainable development of the Chinese economy, reference to international
tax norm and practices; and efficiency tax administration and simplicity in
compliance. Id.
132. The principle of capital export neutrality is reflected by retaining the
system of worldwide taxation and foreign tax credit mechanism, as well as
introducing new anti-deferral rules under Article 45 that are targeted at low-tax
jurisdictions. For the first time, China introduced a general anti-avoidance rule in
Article 47 to supplement the specific international anti-avoidance rules, such as
transfer pricing (Article 41) and thin-capitalization rules (Article 46).
133. For an overview of this policy shift, see John Whalley and Weimin
Zhou, Technology Upgrading and China's Growth Strategy to 2020, The Ctr for Int'l
Governance Innovation Working Paper No. 21, (2007), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfin?abstractid=982232.
134. Margalioth, supra note 56, suggests in his paper that developing
countries may gain a comparative advantage over developed countries if they drop
their corporate tax rates (even to zero) and rely on other forms of taxation (as they
anyway do).
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tax competitiveness. Finally, the harmful tax competition movement and
characterization of China as a "production haven" may have persuaded some
policy makers to remove these havens.
The most important factor of all is China's confidence in attracting FDI
without FDI specific incentives. The Finance Minister explained:
International experience has shown that political stability,
sound economic development, big market, rich human
resources, constantly improving legal environment and
government services are main factors for absorbing foreign
investment, and the tax preference is only one factor.
Therefore, the new Tax Law will not exert a great impact on
foreign investment.
It is clear that China has not abandoned its policy of attracting FDI. In lieu of
FDI-specific tax incentives, China hopes to better attract FDI by offering lower
136
tax rates than other countries.' 35 The Minister of Finance stated:
[T]he level of enterprise income tax rates in the world,
especially the neighboring countries (regions), has to be taken
into account. The average enterprise income tax rate is 28.6%
in 159 countries (regions) around the world in which an
enterprise income tax is applied, while that in China's 18
neighboring countries (regions) is 26.7%. The rate of 25% set
in the Draft is relatively low in the world and will be
conducive to enhancing enterprise competitiveness and
attracting foreign investment.
Preliminaryimpact on FDI- The new tax law has been perceived thus
far to reflect "a growing confidence in China's global standing, not only for
135. The SAT relied on research data indicating the prevailing corporate tax
rate in 20 industrial countries (including EU members, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, Japan and the United States) and 22 non-industrial countries (including
Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, Romania,
Thailand, Turkey, Peru, Argentina, Mongolia, Vietnam and Iran). The research
report is published at the SAT website: www.chinatax.gov.cn (in Chinese). Empirical
research indicates that general corporate tax rate is a better instrument than selective
tax incentives as a means to encourage FDI inflow: Thiess Buettner and Martin Ruf,
Tax Incentives and the Location of FDI: Evidence from a Panel of German
Multinationals, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies,
No.17/2005, available at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dpO476.pdf; W. Steven
Clark, Tax Incentives for Foreign Direct Investment: Empirical Evidence on Effects
and Alternative Policy Options, Can. Tax J. 1139 (2000).
136. Jin, supra note 113.
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137
lower cost manufacturing, but as a consumer market with its own draw."
This, in itself, has a positive impact on investors' confidence in China. The new
tax law certainly provides more certainty and predictability for investors by
removing many aspects of administrative discretions in approving tax
incentives, fixing the tax rate, and less state interference in investment and
business decisions. It is expected that the original tax incentive policy started
the engine of China's economic development and that the new tax policy will
support and sustain the development.
The new EIT Law also continues with the basic framework of the
existing FIE Tax Law, which incorporated many concepts and principles of
corporate taxation used in OECD countries. The tax incentives are designed to
promote long-term, sustainable investment and development.' 38 Tax preferences
continue for favoured activities. Instead of tax holidays, the new law provides
incentives in the form of accelerated deductions for research and development
expenses and certain capital expenditures. Instead of FDI specific tax rate
reductions, the new law provides for a lower rate of 20% for all "small"
enterprises and 15% for all "high-tech" enterprises. 139 It is expected that more
than half of existing FIEs qualify as either small enterprises or high-tech
enterprises.
Investors and capital markets in China appear to welcome the new tax
law as they expect the big domestic companies - the major banks, telecom
companies, oil and gas producers - that dominate indexes of Chinese stocks will see their after-tax earnings boosted by the tax change. 140 Foreign investors
looking for a more transparent and neutral tax policy as part of investment
environment welcome the changes. For example, US technology firm Motorola
declared that it had no plans to alter its investment strategy in China. US-based
General Electric said it will respond to the incentives for clean technologies by
investing 50 million U.S. dollars to build a Shanghai technology center for

137. Tom Leander, How Big a Bite? The big changes in China's tax code
reflect a shift in economic priorities. But much about the law remains a mystery,
CFO Asia (May 2007), available at http://www.cfoasia.com/archives/20070510.htm. The 2007 tax reform has been perceived to represent China's commitment to
the WTO, which can only strengthen China's attraction to foreign investment. The
tax increase for FIEs "will not crush out the zest of foreign investment" because
"what weighs in their decision is China's huge market potential." Thus far, negative
reaction to the new law is mostly associated with the lack of detailed rules and
regulations to implement the law.
138. Tax-preferred investments include those in agriculture, forestry, animal
husbandry and fishery, public infrastructure, environmental protection, energy and
water resources conservation, research and development and transfers of technology.
139. EIT Law, supra note 40, art.4 & 28.
140. Andrew Baston, China's Expected New Tax Law would Even the
Playing Field, The Wall Street J. Feb. 26, 2007, at C9.
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environmentally friendly products. 141 Similarly, established FIEs that have used
up their tax holidays or are engaged in the activities that are tax-favoured under
the new law (such as research and development,infrastructure,
environmental
142
industries, etc.) stand to benefit under the new law.
Foreign manufacturers that are making products for sale in China are
attracted to China by the internal market, not the tax incentives. As such, ending
the FDI-specific tax incentives had minimal impact on these investors. Foreign
investors contemplating activities in non-productive activities (such as services)
would be similarly unaffected by the new tax policy as such activities were not
eligible for tax incentives under the previous regime. 143 "Footloose" investors
may move out of China to jurisdictions offering lower corporate tax rates, such
as Vietnam, but the sign of such flight is not yet emerging.
C. Harmful Tax Competition
According to the OECD report on Harmful Tax Competition Report:
An Emerging Global Issue' 44 countries engage in harmful tax competition by
offering "preferential tax regimes" or being tax havens. Tax havens are harmful
to other countries by eroding their tax base, thereby reducing those countries'
revenue for financing social welfare. 145 Preferential tax regimes also erode the
tax base of other countries. 146 In addition, by distorting locational decisions,
FDI may be located in a country where the pre-tax return is lower, thereby
reducing the global efficiency in allocation of resources. The OECD's
position
148
147
has been well debated in literature and the views are mixed.
141. Leander, supra note 137.
142. Id. Leander, reports that some multinationals have adapted their
business plans to the policy change. GE (General Electric) China has announced it
will invest 50 million U.S. dollars in its Shanghai-based technology center for
products serving environmental protection, including more efficient airplane engines
and wind power generators, seawater desalination technology and energy-saving
bulbs.
143. See Olivia Chung, Mixed feelings over China's new tax system, China
Business, Mar. 21, 1997, available at http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_
Business/IC2 ICbO1 .html.
144. OECD 1998 Report,, supra note 115; OECD, Towards Global Tax CoOperation: Report to the 2000 Ministerial Council Meeting and Recommendations
by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs: Progress in Identifying and Eliminating Harmful
Tax Practices. Paris, OECD 2000.
145. OECD 1998 Report, supra note 115.
146. Id., 4.
147. See, for example, Reuven Avi-Yohan, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000); - Reuven
Avi-Yohan, Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax
Competition, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 371 (2004); William B. Barker, Optimal
International Taxation and Tax Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22
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China is clearly not a classic tax haven.' 49 Chinese FDI tax incentives
are technically not "preferential tax regimes" because they are designed "to
attract investment in plant, building and equipment" not "geographically mobile
activities."'5 0 And yet, these incentives were intended to attract investment away
from other countries to China's "production havens."' 151 Classic tax havens have
been leading sources of FDI inflow to China. The British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Samoan and Mauritius are among the top ten sources. 52 In
2005, for example, FDI from British Virgin Islands (USD5.96 billion) was more
than five times of that from the United States (USD 1.03 billion). 153 Therefore,
China offers an interesting case study on the issue of harmful tax competition
as well as the interaction between the tax laws of the home country and the host
country. Two specific questions are examined below: (a) Are the Chinese tax
incentives responsible for changing the investor's decision to invest in China
rather than at home; (b) Are these incentives responsible for increasing the use
of tax havens to avoid residence country's tax?
Base erosion in the home country - Some recent studies show that
source country tax incentives do not affect the decision of a multinational as to
NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 161 (2002); Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The
OECD View, 32 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 311 (1999); Rajiv Biswas, ed.
International Tax Competition: Globalization and Fiscal Sovereignty. London:
Commonwealth Secretariat, 2002; Lorraine Eden & Robert T. Kudrle, Tax Havens:
Renegade States in the International Tax Regime? 27 Law & Pol'y 109 (2005);
Richard A. Johnson, Why Harmful Tax Practices Will Continue After Developing
Nations Pay: A Critique of the OECD's Initiatives Against Harmful Tax
Competition, 26 B.C. Third World L. J. 351 (2006) (reviewing William BrittainCatlin, Offshore: the Dard Side of the Global Economy (Farra, Straus, and Giroux
2005); Keith Engel, Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the
Right, Stuck in the Middle with Subpart F, 79 Texx L. Rev. 1525 (2001); Littlewood,
supra note 63; Roin, supra note 114.
148. For example, Littlewood states that "The OECD seems on solid
ground, therefore, in its assertion that tax havens generally detract from global
welfare. There are, therefore, good reasons for eradicating tax havens" Littlewood,
supra note 63, at 439. However, he finds the OECD position on preferential tax
regimes problematic. Roin, supra note 114, argues against the OECD position in
general. The essays included in the book edited by Biswas, supra note 147, generally
support tax competition and take a negative view of trying to curb it. See Terrence R.
Chorvat, A Different Perspective on Tax Competition, 35 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.
501 (2002).
149. China was referred to as a "production haven" because of the tax
incentives were granted mostly to FDI engaged in productive activities. Avi-Yonah,
supra note 114.
150. OECD 1998 Report, supra note 115, 6.
151. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 114.
152. For a list of origins of FDI, see China Statistical Year Book (2005),
available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2005/html/R1815e.htm.
153. Id.
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whether to invest domestically or overseas in the form of FDI. 154 Once a
multinational has decided to invest in a developing country, it is questionable
whether the host country tax incentives actually affect the location of the
investment. One view is that "once other factors have provoked the decisions
to set up production facilities in a broad area, then the more precise location
decision may be strongly affected by such [incentive] factors."' 55 Another view
is that developing countries are in a "no-win" situation with respect to attracting
as they seem likely to lose revenue without
FDI by using tax incentives
156
attracting additional FDI.
There is no conclusive evidence that Chinese FDI tax incentives enticed
investment away from the investor's home country, although it is possible that
these incentives attracted FDI away from other developing countries, especially
those in the same region. In terms of low-cost manufacturing and processing investments in extractive industries, and other productive activities that are cost
- sensitive, it is difficult to imagine that any OECD member country could
compete with China for similar investment projects. Even if Chinese tax
incentives were effective in influencing the location of FDI in China, they could
not be said to have contributed to "poaching" the tax base of the investor's
home country.
Home country's tax policy - In order to examine the potential harmful
effect of Chinese tax incentives to the investor's residence country, it is
necessary to examine that country's system of taxing foreign source income,
especially foreign business income. At the moment, the residence country is
typically a member of the OECD15 7 that has either an "exemption" system, a
"credit" system or a hybrid. Under the exemption system, foreign income
earned by a resident is exempted from taxation in the residence country. Such
exemption system is often justified on ground of capital import neutrality (CIN)
in that the worldwide tax burden on the income is determined by the source
country. Under a credit system, foreign income is taxable in the residence
country, but a credit is granted for foreign taxes paid dollar for dollar up to the
amount of domestic tax payable. The credit system is often justified on ground

154. See Devereaux & Freeman, supra note 56.
155. Morisset and Pirnia, supra note 57, reviewing a study by Forsyth in
1972: D. Forsyth, US Investment in Scotland. (Praeger 1972).
156. Goodspeed, supra note 80, at 13.
157. The overwhelming majority of multinational enterprises are resident in
OECD countries. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 114, at 383. In 2004, only five of the
top 100 multinational companies were from developing countries (China, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Korea, and Singapore), while 85 were from the EU, Japan and the
United States; see United Nations, World Investment Report 2006, New York and
Geneva 2006, http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2006_en.pdf.
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of capital export neutrality
(CEN) in that foreign income is taxed in the same
1 58
way as domestic income.
Generally speaking, Chinese FDI tax incentives cannot erode an exempt
country's tax base' 59 because Chinese income is not included in the tax base in
the first place. In the case of a credit country, Chinese tax incentives have the
effect of "giving" China's tax base to the residence country. Even if a tax
sparing credit is granted by the residence country, its tax base cannot be said to
have been eroded by Chinese tax incentives, because the tax base is the same
as if Chinese taxes were paid.
Because Chinese tax incentives apply mostly to FDI and portfolio
investment in China remains limited, 160 the focus of the debate is the possible
erosion of the tax base related to foreign business income. We will use Canada
and the United States as examples in demonstrating whether Chinese tax
incentives actually erode the tax base of these countries.

158. It is beyond the scope of this article to overview the literature on
international tax neutralities and the classification of tax systems of OECD countries.
For further reference, see Hugh J. Ault & Brian J. Arnold, Comparative Income
Taxation: A Structural Analysis (Kluwer Law International 2d ed. 2004); Reuven S.
Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification,
74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301 (1996); Michael Graetz, Taxing International Income:
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 Tax L.
Rev. 261 (2001); Michael Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio
Income, 56 Tax L. Rev. 537 (2003); Shaviro, supra note 124.
159. The exemption system generally does not apply to foreign portfolio
income as a result of anti-deferral rules under domestic tax law. For an overview of
these rules, see Brian Arnold, The Taxation of Controlled Foreign Corporations: An
International Comparison. (Canadian Tax Foundation 1986); Daniel Sandler, Tax
Treaties and Controlled Foreign Company Legislation: Pushing the Boundries
(Deventer, The Netherlands 2d e. 1998): IFA, Limits on the Use of Low-Tax
Regimes by Multinational Businesses: Current Measures and Emerging Trends, 86b
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (2001); OECD, Controlled Foreign Company
Legislation, Paris, OECD, 1996; United States Department of Treasury, The Deferral
of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study
(Dec. 2000).
160. Earning portfolio income in China through a Chinese resident
corporation is not yet common. Chinese regulations generally require FIEs to be
engaged in production and business activities. Investment holding companies are
allowed only to hold investments in the same corporate group. In 2005, while FDI
inflow was valued over 603 billion U.S. dollars, Chinese companies issued USDI.6
billion worth of shares overseas and entered into 1.08 billion U.S. dollars of
international leasing transactions. Technology transfers are generally associated with
FDI; FIEs imported more than half of the foreign technology imported by China. See
Ministry of Commerce, http://zhs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200707/
20070704841184.html, visited on Jul. 12, 2007.

2007]

The Rise and Fallof Chinese Tax Incentives

Canada- Canada is generally a credit country,16 1 but implements an
exemption system with respect to foreign active business income. In
determining the amount of foreign tax credit, Canada has traditionally allowed
a tax sparing credit (including one under the Canada-China Tax Treaty).
Foreign portfolio income is currently taxable whether or not it is earned through
a foreign corporation, whereas foreign business income earned through a
foreign affiliate is not currently taxable. Foreign active business income earned
through a foreign affiliate resident in a treaty country 162 is included in an
"exempt surplus" account of the foreign affiliate. Dividends paid of the exempt
surplus account are "exempt dividends," fully excluded from the Canadian
parent's income. 63 In effect, foreign active business income is subject to tax
only in the foreign country. Canadian tax is payable only when the Canadian
company distributes dividends
to individual shareholders in Canada or to non164
resident shareholders.

Assuming that a Canadian resident company, Canco, carries on business
in China through a branch or permanent establishment and the Chinese income
is free from Chinese tax under the tax incentive legislation. For Canadian tax
purposes, Canco must include its Chinese income in reporting its worldwide
income and claim a credit for Chinese tax. Under the standard foreign tax credit
rules, since no Chinese tax was paid, there is no credit available. However, by
virtue of the tax sparing credit, Canco can obtain a credit for the Chinese tax
that would have been paid in the absence of the tax incentives. To the extent
that the Canadian tax rate exceeds the nominal Chinese rate, Canco still has
Canadian tax payable. In other cases, there is no Canadian tax payable, so that
the Chinese income is free from tax in both China and Canada. In this case, it
is the tax sparing credit granted by Canada that reduces the Canadian tax base,
not Chinese tax incentives.

161. The Canadian FAPI regime technically adopts a "gross-up" and
deduction system that mimics a foreign credit system. For further discussion, see Li,
Cockfield and Wilkie, Canadian International Taxation: Principles and Practices,
(Lexis-Nexis, 2006.)
162. If the foreign business income is earned by a foreign affiliate in a nontreaty country, it goes to a "taxable surplus" account and the dividends paid of such
account are taxable. An "indirect foreign tax credit" is available to recognize the
foreign corporate income tax paid with respect to the taxable dividends received by a
Canadian corporate shareholder. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.1 (5th supp.), as
amended, [hereinafter ITA], § I 13(1)(b).
163. ITA, § 113(1)(a).
164. If the individual shareholder is a resident, a dividend tax credit is
available. If the shareholder is a non-resident, a withholding tax of 25% (reduced by
treaties) applies to the amount of dividends received. If the shareholder is a
corporation or tax exempt entity (such as a pension fund), the dividends are not
taxable.
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What if Canco carries on business in China through a wholly-owned
subsidiary (a "foreign investment enterprise" under Chinese law)? 165 Any
business income earned by the Chinese subsidiary is not currently taxable in
Canada. Because China is a "designated treaty country," the dividends received
by Canco qualify as "exempt dividends," not taxable in Canada. China imposes
no withholding tax on the dividend payments.1 66 As such, the Chinese income
can be repatriated to Canada without either Chinese or Canadian tax. When
Canco distributes the dividends received from China to its shareholders, the
shareholders (whether resident individuals or non-resident) are liable to pay
Canadian tax. 167 The Canadian tax base could be considered as being eroded to
the extent of non-taxation of the Chinese business income when earned and
when repatriated to Canco. However, such erosion is really caused directly by
Canadian tax policy, not Chinese tax incentives. Canada chose to implement
CIN by exempting Chinese business income from Canadian tax.
What if Canco makes its investment in China through a wholly-owned
subsidiary in a tax haven? A popular tax haven for Canadian companies is
Barbados. Assuming Canco establishes a foreign affiliate in Barbados (BFA)
that qualifies as an International Business Corporation and taxable at the rate of
3%. BFA then invests in a Chinese FIE. The FIE qualifies for a tax holiday
under Chinese tax incentives legislation and pays no Chinese income tax. After
the expiration of the tax holiday, the FIE borrows money from BFA to expand
operations. The interest expense is tax deductible in China.' 6 The interest
received by BFA, although formally passive income from property subject to
the anti-deferral rules 169 (similar to the US SubPart F rules), is deemed to be
165. For Canadian income tax purposes, a Chinese FIE, other than a
contractual joint venture that takes the form of a partnership or contractual
arrangement, is generally characterized as a corporation. If a Canadian corporation
owns 10% or more of the equity interest in an FIE, the FIE is a foreign affiliate.
166. As long as the business income stays in a "corporate solution," no
Canadian tax is payable. The Canadian corporation excludes the dividends from the
Chinese FIE under § 113(1)(a) of the ITA. If it pays dividends to another Canadian
resident corporation, the inter-corporate dividends are tax-free under the ITA (§ 121).
167. Canadian personal income tax is applicable to any capital gains
realized by a resident shareholder. As such - to the extent that the gain is derived
from the value of the Chinese business income, which is increased by the tax
incentives - Canada can tax it.

168. Interest paid to the BFA may be subject to a Chinese withholding tax
at the rate of 10%. See China-Barbados Tax Treaty, Articlel0, available at SAT
website.
169. ITA §§ 91 & 95. Under the Canadian foreign accrual property income
(FAPI) rules, a Canadian resident shareholder is currently taxable on the FAPI
earned by a controlled foreign affiliate. The most important type of FAPI is foreign
portfolio income. Dividends, interest, rents and royalties received by a tax haven
affiliate from a related affiliate (i.e., a Chinese FIE) are generally deemed to be
active business income, and thus excluded from FAPI.
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active business income. 170 Because Barbados is a "designated treaty country,"
the interest income is added to its exempt surplus, out of which exempt
dividends can be paid to Canco. This tax structure is attractive to Canco because
Canco can finance its operations in China by borrowing funds to subscribe
shares of BFA and obtain a "double dip" for the interest expense: once in China
by the FIE, and again in Canada by Canco.17 1 This type of international doubledip was considered offensive to tax policy because the dividends are exempt
from Canadian tax. But a recent proposal 172 to end the double dip generated a
storm of protest from business and tax professionals and had to be significantly
narrowed down. This illustrates the fundamental point that the erosion of
Canadian tax base is the direct result of Canadian tax policy,' 73 not Chinese tax
policy.
United States - The United States is also a credit country, but
implements CEN largely in the case of foreign portfolio income. The United

States has never granted a tax sparing credit to any developing country,
including China. 174 Foreign business income is taxable in the United States if
earned directly by a United States corporation. Because of the check-the-box
170. ITA § 95(2)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
171. In addition to using the Barbados affiliate as a financing vehicle, it can
be used to hold valuable intangibles or channelling management fees. Royalties and
management fees paid by the Chinese joint venture are deductible in China. Chinese
withholding tax is zero on management fees and maximum of 10% on royalties by
virtue of the China-Barbados Tax Treaty. The Chinese source management fees and
royalties are added to the Barbados affiliate's "exempt surplus" out of which exempt
dividends are paid. If Barbados were not a treaty country, the interest, royalty and

management fees would go to a "taxable surplus" and only "taxable dividends" can
be paid to the Canadian parent. So, in the case of Canadian companies, using a tax
haven that has a treaty with China and Canada is extremely beneficial.
172. See, Backgrounder, International Tax Avoidance and Tax Havens,
published by the Department of Finance, Canada, http://www.fin.gc.ca/news07/
data/07-041 2e.html.
173. Canada has not attempted to amend the FAPI rules because of the
policy concern for CIN and the competitiveness of Canadian multinationals.
Territorial taxation of active business income is a fundamental principle in Canadian
international tax law. Excluding interest, royalties and rents from FAPI is consistent
with this principle as long as these payments are received from a related foreign
affiliate that deducts the payments in computing its active business income. In other
words, the origin of these payments is an active business and the business income
should be taxed in the country where the business is carried on.
174. See Karen B. Brown, Missing Africa: Should U.S. International Tax
Rules Accommodate Investment in Developing Countries? 23 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
45. at 78 (2002); Paul D. Reese, Comment, United States Tax Treaty Policy Toward
Developing Countries: The China Example, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 369 at 379 (1987).
For further comments, see Laurey Damian, Note: Reexamining U.S. Tax Sparing
Policy with Developing Countries: The Merits of Falling in Line with International
Norms, 20 Va. Tax Rev. 467 (2000).
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176
rules,' 75 Chinese joint ventures may be checked as flow-through entities.
Foreign business income earned indirectly through a foreign affiliate is not
currently taxable in the United States. Dividends received from such affiliates
are taxable in the United States after a deduction for a direct and indirect foreign
tax credit. There are proposals 177 to replace the credit system with a territorial
or exemption system, but they have not been adopted into law.
Assuming a United States corporation, USCo, carries on business
activities in China through a branch or permanent establishment and the Chinese
income is exempted from Chinese tax. Under United States law, the Chinese
income is currently taxable. USCo cannot claim any credit for the Chinese tax
because there is no tax sparing credit available. USCo ends up paying United
States tax on its Chinese income.
If USCo carries on business in China through a Chinese FIE and treats
the FIE as a corporation, the FIE's business income is not currently taxable in
the United States. When the FIE pays dividends to USCo, the dividends are free
from Chinese withholding tax, but are taxable in the United States. Since there
is no Chinese taxes paid and there is no tax sparing credit available, there is no
direct or indirect foreign tax credit for Chinese taxes. The United States ends up
taxing the Chinese income in full. As such, Chinese tax incentives clearly do
not cause any base erosion in the United States. There are the benefits of
deferral and averaging, but, as argued in the context of Canada, this is the result
of US tax policy. The United States could disallow such benefits, but choose not
to.
If USCo invests in China through a tax haven subsidiary, the main tax
advantage is the deferral of U.S. tax on the dividends and other payments
received from the Chinese FIE. As long as the income is outside the Subpart F
regime, there is no immediate taxation of the tax haven subsidiary's income. If
the dividends, interest, royalties, and management fees were received from
China directly by USCo, they would be currently taxable in the United States.

175. Regs. § 301.7701-2.
176. Pierre Maugue, Tax Incentives in the People's Republic of China: Who
Benefits? 5 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 155 (1997).
177. President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair and
Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America's Tax System (2005); and Staff of J. Comm.
On Taxation, 108 th Cong., Options to Improve Tax Compliance and Reform Tax
Expenditures (2005). Earlier in 2005, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
suggested a similar shift on the basis of two arguments. First, the credit system
allows deferral of US taxation of foreign earnings of US-owned foreign corporations,
which distorts business decisions on where and how to invest these earnings
(presumably the earnings are not repatriated to the US for tax reasons). Second, the
credit system often allows US multinational corporations to achieve US tax results
more favorable than they could obtain under an exemption system. For more
comment, see Lawrence Lokken, Territorial Taxation: Why Some U.S.
Multinationals May Be Less Than Enthusiastic About the Idea (and Some Ideas They
Really Dislike), Vol.59 S.M.U. L. Rev. 751-72 (2006).
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It is thus not surprising that Luxembourg, Bermuda, Barbados, UK Caribbean
Islands, and The Netherlands are among the countries with the largest US
affiliate operations. 178 Avoiding U.S. tax by American companies in such
manner can hardly be blamed on Chinese tax incentives. The removal of
Chinese tax incentives after 2007 will unlikely change the investment pattern
of American companies.
To sum up, tax incentives in China result in non-taxation of income
earned in China. They do not have the effect of eroding the tax base of the
residence country. For an exemption country, this point is very clear. If the
residence country has a credit system, including a tax sparing credit, such as
Canada, the conclusion is the same - Chinese tax incentives do not erode that
country's tax base against its wish. If the residence country has a credit system
without a tax sparing credit, such as the United States, the non-taxation in China
is, in effect, a "gift of tax base" from China as it can tax Chinese income in full.
This analysis is the same whether FDI in China is made directly from the
residence country or indirectly through a tax haven jurisdiction. Ultimately, the
tax base of the residence country is eroded to the extent of tax deferral achieved,
but it is the result of the domestic tax policy of the residence country.
D. Inter-nationEquity andRedistribution
The issue of inter-nation equity and redistribution has received
increasing attention in tax literature. Scholars have suggested that developed
countries assist developing countries through tax sparing credits,1 79 broader
source-based tax jurisdiction through tax treaties,1 80 or amended domestic
Subpart F rules.181 However, the inter-nation equity implications of the FDI tax
incentives offered by developing countries have not been addressed much in
literature. While formal redistribution from a high-income country to lowincome countries through the above mentioned measures remains theoretical,
178. See U.S. MNE Operations, 2003, reproduced in Kimberly A. Clausing
and Reuven Avi-Yonah, Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A
Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment (The Brookings Institution, Jun. 2007).
179. See Brown (2002), supra note 174. For a reply to Brown's argument
see McDaniel, supra note 57. See also Karen Brown, Transforming the Unilateralist
into the Internationalist: New Tax Treaty Policy Toward Developing Countries, in
Taxing America, (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, eds. 1996, at 214.).
180. Kim Brooks, Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from LowIncome Countries: A Comparison of Canada and Australia's Policies, 5(1) eJoumal
of Tax Research (2007) (forthcoming) (suggesting a broadening of the source
taxation over royalties as a means of helping developing countries); Allison
Christians, Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case
Study, 71 Brooklyn L. Rev. 639 (2005) (US tax treaties have functioned ineffectively
as a means for assisting low-income countries).
181. McDaniel, supra note 57.
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the implicit redistribution of tax base from a low-income country to highincome countries occurs whenever the former grants tax incentives to investors
from the latter. A normative analysis of the effect of Chinese FDI tax incentives
seems to indicate this.
Inter-nationequity - Inter-nation equity requires a fair allocation of the
international tax base among countries.' 82 It is extremely difficult, if at all
possible, to determine whether a country's share of the international tax base is
"fair" or "equitable." The allocation may be considered to be equitable "if every
' 83
country has the right to tax all profits having their source within its borders."'
In the case of bilateral tax treaties, those that are based on the UN Model Tax
Convention are generally considered more equitable to developing countries as
they allow more
source-based tax jurisdiction than the OECD Model Tax
84
Convention.'

The standard debate on inter-nation equity has little bearing on the
analysis of FDI tax incentives granted by low-income countries as these
countries "voluntarily" give up their tax base in the hope of enticing FDI.
Nonetheless, the existence of these FDI specific incentives certainly worsens the
inequity in the sharing of the tax base between the low-income host country and
the high-income home country.
Inter-nationredistribution- In a single-state context, equity generally
requires redistribution of income by way of progressive taxation.185 In an internation context, there is no similar mechanism for redistribution at the level of
taxpayers. Globalization may have increased the need for inter-nation
redistribution. 186 Indeed, "there appears to be no sound theoretical reason to
182. See Peggy Musgrave, Tax Policy in the Global Economy, in Studies in
Fiscal Federalism and State-Local Finance, UK 2002. For a review of this concept,
see Jinyan Li, International Taxation in the Age of Electronic Commerce: A
Comparative Study chapter 13. (Canadian Tax Foundation 2003).
183. A. Schafer and C. Spengel, The Impact of ICT on Profit Allocation
within Multinational Groups: Arm's Length Pricing or Formula Apportionment?
Centre for European Economic Research, at ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zewdocs/dp/dp0353.pdf.
184. Alex Easson, International Tax Reform and the Inter-Nation Allocation
of Tax Revenue. Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 1991, at 20.
185. For more analysis of inter-individual equity, see Louis Kaplow,

Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42, National Tax J. 139
(1989); Paul R. McDaniel and James R. Repetti, Horizontal and Vertical Equity: The
Musgrave/Kaplow Exchange, 1, Fla. Tax Rev. 607 (1993); Martin J. McMahon, Jr.
and Alic G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Case for Progressive
Taxation, 4 Fla. Tax Rev. 1 (1998).
186. See, e.g., Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at 50: Progressive
Taxation, 'Globalization,' and the New Millennium, 4, Fla. Tax Rev. 731 (2000). For
a discussion of fairness in international taxation, see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J.
Peroni, and Stephen E. Shay, Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay
Case for Taxing Worldwide Income, 5 Fla. Tax Rev. 301 (2001).
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restrict redistribution to members of any single tax jurisdiction."' 87 However,
inter-nation redistribution of income has not been widely espoused, even among
proponents of inter-nation equity.' 88 No nation has ever made a genuine
commitment to worldwide equity.189 In the absence of a world government, the
fact remains that "the freedom and independence, as well as the economic
welfare, of people varies from nation to nation." 190 It is not even considered
desirable by some scholars
to have a world government because it "would likely
191
become a dictatorship."'
Under the current international tax regime, the tax sparing mechanism
can be viewed as an instrument of redistribution as the home country foregoes
the right to tax its residents on their foreign income. This mechanism has been
recently scaled back by OECD countries on ground of abuse and potential for
international non-taxation. 92 In theory, an inter-nation
redistribution system
93
could be envisioned through the design of tax rates:'
For instance, the tax share in profits earned by non-residents
might be allowed to rise inversely to the level of per capita
income in [source jurisdiction] and directly in relation to per
capita income in [residence jurisdiction]. Such a scheme would

187. See, for example, Reuven Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition,
and The Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113, 7 Harvard L. Rev. 1573-676 , at
1649 (2000). A similar sentiment was expressed by Easson, supra note 185.
188. For example, Nancy Kaufman argues that inter-nation equity should be
the foundation of an equitable international tax system, but did not expand the
concept to include inter-country redistribution; see Equity Considerations in
International Taxation, 26, Brooklyn J. Int'l L. 1465 (2001). See also Kaufman,
Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29, Law & Policy in Int'l
Business 145-203 (1998).
189. Graetz, supra note 159, at 278.
190. Id, at 278.

191. Id, at 278. In this respect, Graetz cites John Rawls, The Law of Peoples
(1999) and F. H. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace (1996).
192. OECD Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration. (1998).
193. Peggy B Musgrave and Richard A. Musgrave, Fiscal Coordination and
Competition in an International Setting, in L. Eden, ed., Retrospectives on Public
Finance. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (1991), 61-85, at 65-6; Inter-Nation
Equity, in Richard M. Bird and John G. Head, eds., Modem Fiscal Issues. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1972, 63-85; Peggy B. Musgrave, Interjurisdictional
Equity in Company Taxation: Principles and Applications to the European Union, in
Sijbren Cnossen, ed., Taxing Capital Income in the European Union: Issues and
Options for Reform 47-77; (Oxford University Press 2000); Peggy B. Musgrave,
Revisiting the Theory of International Income Taxation: Principal Paper:
Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in International Taxation, 26, Brooklyn J.
Int'l L. 1335 (2001).
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be of particular interest in the relation between developed and
developing countries.' 94
Reverse redistribution- While the current international tax regime has
no formal system of inter-nation redistribution, there is a de facto reverse
redistribution as a result of the FDI tax incentives granted by low-income
countries. The extent of such reverse redistribution depends on who bears the
burden of corporate income tax. "Unfortunately, after decades of analysis, no
consensus exists on the incidence of the corporate tax."' 195 In theory, three
possible groups of individuals may ultimately bear the burden of corporate tax
and thus reap the fruits of tax incentives: shareholders, workers, and customers.
In the case of Chinese tax incentives available to FDI, two of the three
groups of individuals are predominantly non-residents of China. Workers of
FIEs are generally Chinese. They may benefit from tax incentives if part of the
tax savings is shifted to them in the form of higher wages. There has been little
evidence suggesting that FIEs have actually passed their tax savings to Chinese
workers. Low wages has been one of the factors attracting FDI to China in the
first place. Individual shareholders of companies investing in China are
presumably resident in high-income OECD countries. 196 FIEs that benefit from
Chinese tax incentives export their products to mostly high-income countries,
such as the United States, Japan, Germany, UK, and Canada. 19 7 In terms of per
capita GPI (gross national income), the United States ranked 10th (44,970 U.S.
dollars), Canada ranked 23rd (36,170 U.S. dollars), and China ranked 129 in the
world in 2006 (2,010 U.S. dollars). 98
To the extent that shareholders and customers of a multinational
corporation that ultimately benefit from the Chinese tax incentives and residents
in high-income countries, the tax base given up by China has been shifted to
these individuals and their government. Given that China is a low-income
country, such shift of tax revenue is an upside down subsidy to a high-income

194. Musgrave, id., at 59.
195. Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 114, at 381. For a similar conclusion,
see Roin, supra note 114, at 575-8.
196. Top exporters of FDI to China include Japan, the United States,
Germany, the Netherlands, Korea, and Singapore. Ministry of Commerce of the
People's Republic of China, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/
tongjiziliao/v/200706/20070604787959.html, visited on Jul. 2, 2007.
197. China's top export destinations are: the United States (about 1/5 of all
Chinese exports), Japan, Germany, The Netherlands, UK, France, Italy, Spain,
Canada, South Korea, and Australia. See International Monetary Fund; General
Administration of Customs (Beijing); Time, Jul. 9, 2007 at 26-7.
198. See World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 Jul. 2007:
www.siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/GNIPC.pdf.
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country. 199 This is perhaps the "price" China was willing to pay in order to
attract FDI to China,200 but the fact remains that the redistribution puts the
ability-to-pay principle on its head.
Furthermore, it could be argued that the benefit of Chinese tax
incentives is shifted to the government of capital-exporting countries. As
discussed in the context of Canada and the United States, shareholders of
companies investing in China are ultimately taxable in the residence country on
dividends or capital gains from the sale of shares. 20 1To the extent that dividends
or capital gains include the tax savings shifted from China, the residence
an
country actually taxes the amount of tax foregone by China, resulting in 202
indirect shift of revenue from the China's fisc to that of the residence country.
Similar reverse redistribution is likely the outcome of FDI tax incentives
granted by other developing Countries.
V. CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the Chinese experience with FDI tax incentives, several
conclusions can be made. First, FDI-specific tax incentives can be effective
under the "right" conditions. When the conditions change and foreign
investment would have been made in any event, tax incentives became not only
redundant, but also impediments to economic development. Second, the
efficiency of FDI-specific incentives is dependent on their effectiveness in
attracting investment that can generate positive externalities. So, effective
incentive measures are also efficient. However, when incentive measures
encourage "round tripping" or other investment behaviours that have no positive
externalities, they became inefficient. Third, equity implications of FDI tax
incentives have not received much consideration. Like many types of tax
expenditures, FDI tax incentives tend to have the effect of reverse redistribution.
199. If the lost tax revenue must be made up by the Chinese government
through reduced spending that would otherwise benefit Chinese citizens, each
Chinese citizen theoretically gives up some revenue in favour of a richer person in a
foreign country.
200. Because the redistribution aspect of Chinese FDI incentives has not
been discussed in China, there is no official statement that such reverse redistribution
was intended by the Chinese government. It is safe to assume, though, that such
intention did not exist in 1979 when the first tax incentives for FDI were introduced.
201. In the case of public companies, shareholders may be taxed when they
sell the shares and realize capital gains. Consequently, business income earned in
China that is eligible for Chinese tax incentives indirectly becomes part of the tax
base of the residence country when dividends are repatriated from China to the
company and from the company to its shareholders.
202. This could not have been intended as part of China's foreign policy or
development policy. For a capital exporting country, Graetz suggests that it is
possible to consider redistribution internationally as a function of international tax
policy (supra note 158, at 309).
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This is arguably true at the international level: China and Chinese taxpayers
give up tax revenue for the benefit of the government and residents of capitalexporting countries. Finally, on the issue of international harmful tax
competition, the paper shows that FDI-specific tax incentives in China hardly
erode the tax base of capital-exporting countries. The decision of OECD
countries not to tax foreign business income on a current basis in the residence
country gives effect to Chinese tax incentives. When a residence country
decides not to tax business income earned in China, it is difficult to say that its
tax base is eroded by China's decision not to tax the income. If OECD countries
collectively decide to currently tax foreign business income in order to protect
their tax base, 20 3 redistribution from developing countries to OECD countries
would be more evident and severe. Developing countries should rethink about
their FDI tax policy and perhaps emulate China in abolishing tax incentives.

203. See Avi-Yonah (2004), supra note 114 (suggesting a multilateral attack
on tax competition to be led by the World Trade Organization).

